Taxing Emotional Injury Recoveries:
A Critical Analysis of Murphy v. Internal Revenue Service
Gregory L. Germain*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

Introduction......................................................................................................................1

II.

Procedural History of the Murphy Decision ....................................................................5

III.

The Statutory Questions...................................................................................................5
A.
The Court of Appeals’ Analysis. .........................................................................7
B.
The Court of Appeals’ Improper Focus on the Language Used in the
Heading of the Award..........................................................................................7
C.
Ms. Murphy Could Not Exclude Her Award Because Physical
Manifestations of Emotional Distress Do Not Constitute “Personal
Physical Injuries or Physical Sickness” Under IRC Section 104(a)(2). ..............10
D.
Without an Exclusion, Was Ms. Murphy Required to Include Her Award
in Gross Income? .................................................................................................14

IV.

The Constitutional Questions...........................................................................................20
A.
Congress Had the Power to Tax Ms. Murphy’s Damages Award Without
the 16th Amendment............................................................................................20
(1)
The Source of Congress’s Constitutional Power to Tax..........................22
(2)
Early Judicial Interpretations of the Direct Taxing Clause......................24
(3)
The Direct Taxing Clause Under Pollock................................................29
(4)
The Direct Taxing Clause After Pollock and Before the 16th
Amendment..............................................................................................33
(5)
The 16th Amendment and the Judicial Rejection of Pollock’s
Source Rule..............................................................................................39
(6)
Congress’s Tax on Ms. Murphy’s Damages Award Was Not a
Direct Tax Requiring Apportionment......................................................42
(a)
Congress Could Tax Ms. Murphy’s Exchange of Emotional
Distress Damages for Cash. ........................................................42
(b)
Congress Could Tax Ms. Murphy’s Human Capital. ..................45
B.
Congress Had the Power to Tax Ms. Murphy’s Damages Award Under the
16th Amendment..................................................................................................46
(1)
The Court of Appeals’ Holding in Murphy..............................................46

*

Associate Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law. B.A., University of California, Santa
Cruz (1982), J.D. University of California, Hastings College of Law (1985), L.L.M. (Tax) University of
Florida, College of Law (2001). The author is grateful for the thoughtful substantive comments provided
by Professor Peter A. Bell, for the technical assistance provided by his research assistants, Lauren A. Kiley
and Marco Favila, and for the secretarial support provided by Anne Hensberry.

i

(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
V.

The Historical Meaning of “Income” Under the 16th Amendment
Before Macomber. ...................................................................................47
Constitutionalizing Realization: The Troubled History of Eisner v.
Macomber and the Meaning of Income. ..................................................58
Ms. Murphy Realized Income Because She Had No Basis in Her
Human Capital. ........................................................................................66
Ms. Murphy’s Receipts from Human Capital Were Income. ..................71

Conclusion. ......................................................................................................................74

ii

Taxing Emotional Injury Recoveries:
A Critical Analysis of Murphy v. Internal Revenue Service
I.

Introduction.

A unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit recently dropped
a bombshell on Federal income tax jurisprudence by holding in Murphy v. Internal
Revenue Service1 that Congress violated the United States Constitution by attempting to
tax a personal injury award that compensated the taxpayer for emotional and reputational
injuries. The decision has caused an uproar in the tax community, and many expect the
decision to encourage an already booming tax protestor industry.2
The tax community’s primary criticism has focused on the harm done by the
decision to income tax theory and jurisprudence.3 These criticisms miss the mark,
however, because the decision was not moored on tax theory or jurisprudence. Rather,
the court of appeals concluded that Ms. Murphy’s damages award would not have been
considered “income” in 1913, when the 16th Amendment to the United States
Constitution was adopted,4 and therefore could not constitutionally be subject to tax.5
This paper disputes virtually every aspect of the court of appeals’ decision in
Murphy. The first question considered by the court of appeals in Murphy was whether
Ms. Murphy’s damages award was statutorily excluded from income under IRC6 section
104(a)(2). The version of IRC section 104(a)(2) applicable to Ms. Murphy’s damages
award excluded from income all recoveries “on account of a personal physical injury or
physical sickness.”7 The statute also provided that “emotional distress shall not
constitute a physical injury or physical sickness.”8 The court of appeals wrongly
concluded that the award could not be excluded from income under IRC section
104(a)(2) because the Department of Labor hearing panel that issued the award referred
only to “emotional distress” and “professional reputation” in the heading of the award.
The court of appeals’ focus on the language used in the heading of the award was
1

460 F.3d 79 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
See e.g. Ryan J. Donmoyer, Tax Law Ruling by Court May Encourage New Challenges (August 23,
2006), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=azSsFNBVDjJ8&refer=us
(quoting criticism from Yale Law School tax professor Michael Graetz, Former IRS Commissioner Donald
C. Alexander, and University of Cincinnati Law School tax professor Paul Caron); Tax Prof Commentary
after Murphy (2006), available at http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2006/08/tax_prof_commen.html
(quoting ten tax law professors criticizing various aspects of the decision primarily on the basis of tax
theory).
3
Id. Eight of the ten professors argued either that the decision did not comport with modern tax theory,
that the decision failed to consider tax policy, or that the precise holding – that IRC § 104(a) is
unconstitutional – wrongly focused on an exception to an exclusion rather than the operative provision
(IRC § 61). Only two of the ten professors discussed the definitional issue, and only one professor,
Stephen Bank, questioned the fundamental basis for the Court’s ruling – the reliance on later
pronouncements to define the 1913 meaning of “income.”
4
U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (1913).
5
Murphy, 460 F.3d at 92 (holding IRC section 104(a)(2) unconstitutional to the extent it permits Congress
to tax Ms. Murphy’s emotional and reputational damage award).
6
All citations to the IRC are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, Title 26 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.
(2006).
7
IRC § 104(a)(2).
8
IRC § 104 (flush language).
2
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misplaced.9 The court of appeals should have focused on whether Department of Labor’s
award, in fact, included compensation for physical injuries or physical sickness. Even the
court of appeals recognized that the Department of Labor intended the award to
compensate Ms. Murphy for the physical manifestations of emotional distress that she
suffered.10
Instead of asking whether the language in the heading of the award was
sufficiently particular, the court of appeals should have asked whether Ms. Murphy’s
physical manifestations of emotional distress constituted a “personal physical injury”
within the meaning of the statutory language. Had the court of appeals reviewed the
legislative history of the statute, as had the scores of other courts to consider the
question,11 the court of appeals would have discovered that Congress did not intend
physical manifestations of emotional distress to constitute a “personal physical injury or
physical sickness” within the meaning of the statute.12 The court of appeals thus
correctly determined that Ms. Murphy’s award was not statutorily excluded from income
by IRC section 104(a)(2), but for the wrong reason.13
Second, after determining that the award was not specifically excluded from
income, the court of appeals in Murphy should have considered whether the income tax
law required Ms. Murphy to include her award in income, so that it would be subject to
taxation.14 Instead, the court of appeals wrongly concluded that the exclusion in IRC
section 104(a)(2) was unconstitutional for exceeding the grant of power contained in the
16th Amendment of the United States Constitution.15 Even if the court of appeals’
constitutional analysis were correct, it held the wrong provision unconstitutional. Section
104(a)(2) is not the provision of the IRC requiring Ms. Murphy’s damage award to be
included in income. Section 104(a)(2) is an exclusion provision. Before considering the
constitutional validity of the statute, the court of appeals should have determined
whether, notwithstanding the lack of an exclusion in section 104(a)(2), some other
provision of the IRC required Ms. Murphy to include her award in income.
It is IRC section 61 that requires “all income from whatever source derived” to be
included in gross income and thus be subject to tax. It is the application of IRC section
61 to Ms. Murphy’s damages award that would be unconstitutional, if the court of
appeals correctly concluded that Ms. Murphy’s damage award could not constitutionally
be taxed.16 To reach the constitutional question, the court of appeals should first have
considered whether Ms. Murphy’s damage award constituted “income” within the
meaning of IRC section 61 – for if the statute did not reach Ms. Murphy’s damage award,
the court of appeals could not consider whether or not the statute was constitutional.17
In reaching the constitutional question, the court of appeals must implicitly have
concluded that Ms. Murphy’s damage award was “income” within the meaning of IRC
section 61. Ironically, the court of appeals’ unexpressed but necessary holding that Ms.
9

See discussion infra Part III beginning on page 5.
See discussion infra at note 51.
11
See infra note 73.
12
See discussion infra Part III.C beginning at page 10.
13
See discussion infra Part III.C beginning at page 10.
14
See discussion infra Part III.D beginning at page 14
15
See discussion infra Part III.D beginning at page 14.
16
Id.
17
See infra note 35.
10
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Murphy’s award constituted income within the meaning of section 61, but not within the
meaning of the 16th Amendment, would have been contrary to its suggestion that the
word “income” in the IRC was synonymous with the word “income” in the 16th
Amendment.18
Many tax experts believe that the court of appeals should not have reached the
constitutional question.19 They believe that the Ms. Murphy’s award either was income
under both IRC section 61 and the 16th Amendment (in which case it could
constitutionally be taxed), or under neither provision (in which case the statute simply
would not reach the award). This analysis ignores the evolution of the statute. Congress
clearly intended for non-physical-injury awards to be included in gross income under IRC
section 61 when it added the “physical injury or physical sickness” requirement to IRC
section 104(a)(2) in 1996.20 Congress’s intended meaning for IRC section 61 at the time
it amended IRC section 104(a)(2) in 1996 should prospectively govern the interpretation
of the statutory scheme.21 Thus, the court of appeals in Murphy was correct in reaching
the constitutional question, although it failed to meet its obligation to first explicitly hold
that IRC section 61 required Ms. Murphy’s award to be included in income. By failing to
properly address the statutory issue, the court of appeals in Murphy failed to address the
apparent conundrum of the word “income” having a different meaning under the 16th
Amendment than under IRC section 61.22
The final question is whether Congress had the constitutional power to tax Ms.
Murphy’s damages award. The court of appeals concluded that Congress lacked the
constitutional power to tax Ms. Murphy’s compensatory personal injury award because
the award did not constitute “income” within the meaning of the 16th Amendment.23
Unlike the court of appeals’ two prior mistakes, in which it reached the correct
conclusion for the wrong reason, this time the court of appeals’ flawed constitutional
analysis led to the wrong result.
18

See Murphy, 460 F.3d at 85 (“The Supreme Court has held the word "incomes" in the Amendment and
the phrase "gross income" in § 61(a) of the IRC are coextensive.”). In fact, the Supreme Court did not say
in Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940), that the word “income” in the Act and in the 16th
Amendment was coextensive. The Revenue Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 680, had defined gross income to include
all "gains, profits, and income derived . . . from professions, vocations, trades, businesses, commerce, or
sales, or dealings in property, whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership or use of or interest in
such property; also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the transaction of any business carried on
for gain or profit, or gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever." The Court in Clifford
merely stated that “The broad sweep of this language indicates the purpose of Congress to use the full
measure of its taxing power within those definable categories.” Id. Using the full measure of Congress’s
taxing power in a defined manner is different than the word income having the same meaning. Congress
may have had multiple means of implimenting an income system. For example, Congress could have taxed
income accruing annually rather than taxing income upon the occurrence of an event of realization. By
intending the chosen system to have a broad reach does not negate the possibility that other systems could
have been constitutionally chosen.
19
The author engaged in a lengthy debate on the TaxProf discussion board with, among others, Professor
Joseph Dodge of Florida State University College of Law over this point. Professor Dodge contended that
Congress’s amendment to IRC section 104(a)(2) in 1996 could not change the meaning of section 61,
which should be governed by the text of the statute.
20
See discussion infra beginning at note 84
21
Id.
22
See discussion infra beginning at note 86.
23
See discussion infra Part IV beginning at page 20.
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First, the court of appeals erred in stating, without the citation of any authority,
that Congress’s power to tax emanates from the 16th Amendment.24 Indeed, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly and long held that the 16th Amendment granted no new power of
taxation. The taxing power has always emanated from Article I of the Constitution, and
has long been recognized to encompass far more than income.25 Because of the court of
appeals’ initial error in failing to recognize the Constitution’s original grant to Congress
of taxing power in Article I, the court of appeals failed to analyze the alternative
constitutional bases for Congress to tax Ms. Murphy’s personal injury award without
apportionment – as a “duty or excise.” A careful review of tax history shows that the
Supreme Court repeatedly recognized Congress’s ability to tax transactions, whether
involving the sale or exchange of property or the sale of human capital, as duties or
excises, long before the 16th Amendment was adopted.26 Ms. Murphy engaged in just
such a transaction when she received cash in exchange for her emotional distress
damages. Therefore, Congress had the power under Article I of the Constitution to tax
Ms. Murphy’s damages award even if it was not “income” under the 16th Amendment,
because Ms. Murphy engaged in a transaction when she exchanged her emotional distress
damages for cash.
In addition, the court of appeals erred in failing to consider whether a tax on
human capital would ever be direct tax requiring apportionment under Article I of the
Constitution. A careful reading of precedent suggests that the taxation of human capital,
unlike financial capital, has never been treated as property or wealth, and has always been
treated as a legitimate subject for indirect taxation.27
Second, the court of appeals erred in holding that Ms. Murphy’s award was not
income under the 16th Amendment. The court of appeals cited no credible authority for
its conclusion that the adoptors of the 16th Amendment intended for compensatory
recoveries not to be included in income. The court of appeals relied on two
administrative rulings issued years after the adoption of the 16th Amendment and made
in the light of later-rejected Supreme Court statutory interpretations.28 The court of
appeals in Murphy ignored the fact that Congress has always treated wage payments as
income, and wage payments are, like personal injury damage awards, payments in
exchange for human capital.29 The court of appeals failed to cite any proper authority
arising before or contemporaneously with the adoption of the 16th Amendment to suggest
that receipts from human capital would not be considered income. Ms. Murphy received
“income” within the meaning of the 16th Amendment when she received the award
because her financial wealth was increased as a result of the award. The 16th
Amendment gave Congress, not the courts, the power to decide whether or not the
increase in financial wealth should be subject to taxation.
In sum, the court of appeals’ statutory and constitutional analysis was flawed, and
its conclusions were erroneous. The Constitution and the 16th Amendment gave
Congress the power to decide questions of tax policy within its broad limits. The court of
24

See infra note 102
See discussion infra Part IV.A beginning at page 20.
26
See discussion infra Part IV.A beginning at page 20
27
See discussion infra Part IV.A(6)(b) beginning at page 45.
28
See discussion infra Part IV.A(5) beginning at page 39.
29
See discussion infra Part IV.A(2) beginning at page 24.
25
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appeals has usurped Congress’s power over tax policy questions, and its decision
threatens the smooth operation of the tax system – which is the lifeblood of government.
The decision should promptly be overturned.
II.

Procedural History of the Murphy Decision

Marrita Murphy, a former employee of the New York Air National Guard,
brought a claim before the Department of Labor under various whistle blower statutes,
alleging that she was blacklisted by her employer for complaining to state authorities
about environmental hazards at an airbase.30 At her hearing before the Department of
Labor, Ms. Murphy introduced evidence showing that she suffered physical
manifestations from her emotional distress. According to the court of appeals, “Upon
finding Murphy had also suffered from other ‘physical manifestations of stress’ including
‘anxiety attacks, shortness of breath, and dizziness,’ the ALJ recommended
compensatory damages totaling $ 70,000, of which $45,000 was for ‘emotional distress
or mental anguish,’ and $25,000 was for ‘injury to professional reputation’ from having
been blacklisted.”31
Ms. Murphy paid income taxes on her personal injury award, but then brought an
action in the United States District Court against both the IRS and the United States for a
tax refund and for declarative and injunctive relief.32 The government then moved to
dismiss the IRS as an improper party, and sought summary judgment on the merits.
The district court denied the government’s motion to dismiss, holding that the
injunction claims were properly brought against the IRS, but granted the government’s
motion for summary judgment on the merits. The district court also denied Ms.
Murphy’s cross motion for summary judgment.33 Ms. Murphy appealed the grant of
summary judgment to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. The government did not
appeal from the denial of its motion to dismiss the IRS.
The court of appeals began by holding that the IRS was not a proper party, and
should have been dismissed.34 However, because the refund action against the United
States was properly brought, the court of appeals then proceeded to consider the merits of
the refund action.
III.

The Statutory Questions.

30

Murphy, 460 F.3d at 81.
Id. at 82.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id. The court of appeals in Murphy considered this question, even though the government had not
appealed the denial of its motion to dismiss, because the issue concerned the court of appeals’ jurisdiction
over the IRS. Id. The court of appeals reversed the district court’s refusal to dismiss the IRS, holding that
the government did not waive its sovereign immunity for declaratory and injunctive relief suits in tax
controversies, citing 28 U.S.C. section 2201(a) (no waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to
declaratory relief actions “with respect to Federal taxes other than actions brought under section 7428 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.”), and IRC section 7421(a) (prohibiting injunctions restraining
assessment or collection of taxes). Therefore, the Court of Appeals held that the IRS was an improper
party on all counts, and should have been dismissed.
31
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Before considering constitutional questions, a court must first consider whether
the issue can be resolved on the basis of the statute enacted by Congress. A court must
always consider the statutory question before considering the constitutional validity of
the statute, because constitutional issues are to be avoided whenever possible.35
Therefore, the first real issue that the court of appeals in Murphy should have addressed
was whether Ms. Murphy’s award was subject to tax under the applicable statutory rules
adopted by Congress in the IRC. Only after determining that Congress had in fact
statutorily required Ms. Murphy’s award to be included in income should the court of
appeals have proceeded to determine whether the statute was constitutional.
The statutory question requires a two-step analysis: (1) was there a specific
provision in the IRC allowing Ms. Murphy to exclude her award from income, and, if
not, (2) was there a specific provision in the IRC requiring Ms. Murphy to include her
award in income. Only if the first question is answered in the negative and the second
question answered in the affirmative is it proper for the court to consider the
constitutionality of the statutory scheme.
As is discussed below, the court of appeals properly considered whether Ms.
Murphy could exclude her award under IRC section 104(a)(2), but its analysis was
flawed. The court of appeals wrongly focused on the language used in the heading of the
award to conclude that Ms. Murphy’s award did not compensate her for “physical injuries
or physical sickness.” The court of appeals’ focus on the heading used in the award was
misplaced, however, because the award in fact was intended to and did compensate Ms.
Murphy for the physical manifestations of emotional distress that she suffered. The real
question should have been whether Ms. Murphy’s physical manifestations of emotional
distress constituted a “personal physical injury or physical sickness” within the meaning
of IRC section 104(a)(2). The court of appeals reached the right result – that Ms. Murphy
could not exclude her award from income – but for the wrong reason. The award was not
excludible because physical manifestations of emotional distress do not constitute
“personal physical injuries or physical sickness” within the meaning of IRC section
104(a)(2), not because the language used in the heading of the award was too general.
After concluding that Ms. Murphy could not exclude her award from income
under IRC section 104(a)(2), the court should have determined whether any provision of
the IRC required Ms. Murphy’s award to be included in income. The proper question
should have been whether IRC section 61 – the provision subjecting income to taxation –
was unconstitutional as applied to Ms. Murphy’s damages award. The court of appeals
failure to engage in the second step of the analysis ultimately caused it to hold the wrong
provision unconstitutional, and enabled it to avoid addressing a difficult question of
statutory interpretation: whether Ms. Murphy’s award could be “income” under IRC
section 61, but not “income” under the 16th Amendment. The following analysis shows
that the court of appeals correctly proceeded to consider the constitutionality of the
statute, although it again did so for the wrong reasons.

35

See e.g. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 180 (2003) (“‘When the validity of an act of the Congress is
drawn in question, and . . . a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this
Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may
be avoided,’”quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
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A.

The Court of Appeals’ Analysis.

The first substantive issue considered by the court of appeals in Murphy was
whether Ms. Murphy’s damages award should be statutorily excluded from income under
IRC section 104(a)(2). IRC section 104(a)(2) excluded from gross income damage
awards “received . . . on account of personal physical injuries or physical sickness.” The
flush language to section 104(a) provides “[f]or purposes of paragraph (2), emotional
distress shall not be treated as a physical injury or physical sickness,” except to the extent
of amounts paid for medical care.36
Ms. Murphy first argued that her damages award should have been excluded from
income under IRC section 104(a)(2) because she suffered a “personal physical injury” as
a result of the stress of being blacklisted.37 The court of appeals did not address whether
physical manifestations of emotional distress constitute “personal physical injuries”
within the meaning of the statute, an issue discussed below.38 Instead, the court of
appeals focused on the words used by Labor Board in the heading of its damages award.
The Labor Board hearing panel titled the awards “Compensatory damage for emotional
distress or mental anguish” and “Compensatory damage award for injury to professional
reputation.”39 The court of appeals adopted the Government’s argument that “the Board
awarded her damages, not to compensate [her for that] particular injur[y] [physical
manifestations], but explicitly with respect to nonphysical injuries.”40 Because the
heading used by the Board in rendering its award only referred to emotional distress and
reputation, the court of appeals did not consider it relevant that the Board had, in fact,
found that Ms. Murphy suffered serious physical manifestations from that distress, and
had considered these manifestations in setting the amount of her award.41 As a general
matter, tort awards for emotional distress include all consequences of that distress,
including physical manifestations.42 The court of appeals erred in focusing exclusively on
the language used by the Board in the heading of the award, rather than its clear intent,
which was reflected in the award, to compensate Ms. Murphy for her physical
manifestations.
B.

The Court of Appeals’ Improper Focus on the Language Used in the
Heading of the Award.

The court of appeals’ focus on the heading rather than substance of the award was
based on its reading of two Supreme Court cases interpreting the “on account of”
36

IRC § 104(a) (flush language).
Murphy, 460 F.3d at 9-10.
38
See infra Part III.C beginning at page 10.
39
Murphy, 460 F.3d at 84 (“Murphy no doubt suffered from certain physical manifestations of emotional
distress, but the record clearly indicates the Board awarded her compensation only "for mental pain and
anguish" and "for injury to professional reputation." The Board thus having left no room for doubt about
the grounds for her award, we conclude Murphy's damages were not "awarded by reason of, or because of
. . . [physical] personal injuries.”) (citations omitted).
40
Id.
41
See infra beginning at note 50.
42
See F. Patrick Hubbard, Making People Whole Again: The Constitutionality of Taxing Compensatory
Tort Damages for Mental Distress, 49 FLA. L. REV. 725, 748 (December 1997) (purpose of tort law to make
plaintiff whole).
37
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language contained in IRC section 104(a)(2). The court of appeals interpreted the
Supreme Court’s decision in O’Gilvie v. United States43 to require “a strong causal
connection” between the physical injury and the language of the award. The court of
appeals’ reading of O’Gilvie is, however, quite strained.
In 1988, the plaintiffs in O’Gilvie recovered $10 million in punitive damages in a
wrongful death action against the manufacturer of a product that caused the death of their
wife and mother.44 The issue in O’Gilvie was whether the punitive damage award could
be excluded from income under the 1983 version of IRC § 104(a)(2), which excluded
from income all awards of damages “on account of personal injuries or sickness.”45 The
taxpayers in O’Gilvie argued that the punitive damage award should have been excludible
from income because it would not have been recovered “but for” the personal injury to
their wife and mother.46
The Supreme Court in O’Gilvie rejected the taxpayers’ approach. Instead, the
Court held that the statute’s “on account of” language required a direct connection
between the personal injury and the purpose of the remedy. The Court held that punitive
damages are not awarded as compensation for personal injury, but rather to punish the
wrongdoer’s conduct and deter others.47 The Court therefore ruled that the punitive
damages award was not “on account of” the personal injury because the remedy –
punitive damages – was not, as a matter of law, given “on account of” the personal
injury.
The Supreme Court in O’Gilvie also relied on its prior decision in Commissioner
v. Schleier,48 in which it had held that liquidated damages awarded under the
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ( the “ADEA”) were not excludible under
IRC § 104(a). In explaining its holding in Schleier, the Court in O’Gilvie stated:
[P]ain and suffering damages, medical expenses, and lost
wages in an ordinary tort case are covered by the statute
and hence excluded from income "not simply because the
taxpayer received a tort settlement, but rather because each
element . . . satisfies the requirement . . . that the damages
were received 'on account of personal injuries or sickness.'"
In holding that ADEA liquidated damages are not covered,
we said that they are not "designed to compensate ADEA
43

519 U.S. 79 (1996).
Id. at 81.
45
IRC Section 104(a)(2) was amended in 1989 to provide that punitive damages awards “for physical injury
or physical sickness” were not excluded from income. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub.
L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106, §7641(a). The statutory amendment did not apply to written binding
settlements or decrees in effect on or before July 10, 1989, and was therefore not effective on the settlement
in O’Gilvie. See Id. at § 7641(b)(2); O’Gilvie, 519 U.S. at 89-90. The statute was again amended in 1996
to make personal injury awards taxable in all cases, but again the statutory amendment was not retroactive
and therefore did not apply to the settlement in O’Gilvie. See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, §
1605, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1838; O’Gilvie, 519 U.S. at 90.
46
Id. at 82.
47
Id. at 83 (“The Government says that such damages were not ‘received . . . on account of’ the personal
injuries, but rather were awarded ‘on account of’ a defendant's reprehensible conduct and the jury's need to
punish and to deter it.”).
48
515 U.S. 323 (1995).
44
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victims," instead, they are "'punitive in nature.'" Applying
the same reasoning here would lead to the conclusion that
the punitive damages are not covered because they are an
element of damages not "designed to compensate . . .
victims.49
It is important to note that the Supreme Court in O’Gilvie and Schleier did not
focus on what the award said the damages were for – the label used – but on the
underlying legal purpose of the remedy. This is very different from the court of appeals
interpretation of these cases in Murphy. Ms. Murphy’s claims were brought under
federal statutes that authorized awards of “compensatory damages.”50 According to the
lower court, “the Administrative Law Judge noted and the Administrative Review Board
confirmed that Murphy suffered from [Bruxism and] other ‘physical manifestations of
stress’ including ‘anxiety attacks, shortness of breath, and dizziness.’51 Unlike the claims
in O’Gilvie and Schleier which were legally limited in a way having tax significance
(punitive damages in O’Gilvie and liquidated damages for age discrimination in Schleier,
both of which were, statutorily, not intended as compensation for personal injury), the
claim in Murphy did not have a remedy legally limited in a way that would have tax
significance. Ms. Murphy was entitled to and did recover for all of the consequences of
her emotional distress, including her physical manifestations. There was nothing in the
quoted language of the award to suggest that the Labor Board did not accept as true and
take into account in setting the amount of the award the physical manifestations of
emotional distress suffered by Ms. Murphy. Indeed, the court of appeals recognized that
the Board had in fact intended, by its award, to compensate Ms. Murphy for her physical
manifestations.52
The court of appeals’ error in focusing on the language used in the heading of the
award rather than on what the award in fact was intended to compensate was
demonstrated by the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Dotson v. U.S.,53 where the court held that
a taxpayer who recovered damages under the Employment Retirement and Income
Security Act (ERISA)54 could exclude the portion of the award that was given to
compensate for personal injuries, even though the courts later determined that ERISA
precluded compensatory damages awards. The Dotson court held that the taxpayer could
exclude the award, which had been wrongly given to compensate for damages, because
the award, in fact, had been given on account of personal injuries, even though the
remedy for ERISA violations was later held to be more limited. Similarly, in cases
involving settlement allocations, the courts have required a factual inquiry into the true
49

519 U.S. at 83-84.
Murphy v. Internal Revenue Service, 362 F. Supp. 2d 206, 210 (D.C. 2005), rev’d 460 F.3d 79 (D.C. Cir.
2006).
51
Id. citing Leveille v. New York Air National Guard, 1999 WL 966951, Recommended Decision and
Order at 6 (ALJ Feb. 9, 1998.). The court of appeals also recognized this in its opinion. See infra note 52.
52
Murphy, 460 F.3d at 81 (“Upon finding Murphy had also suffered from other ‘physical manifestations of
stress’ including ‘anxiety attacks, shortness of breath, and dizziness,’ the ALJ recommended compensatory
damages totaling $70,000, of which $45,000 was for ‘emotional distress or mental anguish,’ and $25,000
was for ‘injury to professional reputation’ from having been blacklisted.”).
53
87 F.3d 682 (5th Cir. 1996).
54
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) and 1140.
50
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nature of the award, rather than a strict focus on the labels used by the parties.55 The
theory used by the Supreme Court in O’Gilvie and Schleier simply does not support the
court of appeals’ blunt focus on the language of the heading in the Labor Board’s award,
rather than the true purpose and intent of the award.
If physical manifestations of emotional injuries were excludible as “physical
injuries,” the courts in Murphy should have made an allocation between the physical
aspects of the emotional award and the purely mental aspects of the emotional award.56
However, Congress did not intend physical manifestations of emotional distress to
constitute a “personal physical injury or physical sickness” within the meaning of IRC
section 104(a)(2).
C.

Ms. Murphy Could Not Exclude Her Award Because Physical
Manifestations of Emotional Distress Do Not Constitute “Personal
Physical Injuries or Physical Sickness” Under IRC Section 104(a)(2).

The question that the court of appeals in Murphy should have addressed is
whether an award on account of emotional injuries causing physical manifestations
constitutes an award on account of “personal physical injuries or physical sickness”
within the meaning of IRC section 104(a)(2). The meaning of the statutory language is
greatly aided by a review of the statute’s judicial and legislative history.
In 1918, Congress added language to the income tax statute to exempt damages
received “on account of [personal] injuries and sickness.”57 This basic exclusion has
remained in the statute ever since. However, beginning in 1989, important judicial and
statutory limitations were recognized.
In 1989, the House of Representatives proposed, and ultimately passed, a bill
limiting the personal injury exclusion to “cases involving physical injury or sickness.”58
The Senate passed a bill that did not accept the House’s proposed language. The
Conference Committee reached a compromise providing that the exclusion for personal
injury or sickness “shall not apply to any punitive damages in connection with a case not
involving physical injury or physical sickness.”59 This compromise was accepted by both
houses and became law.60
55

See e.g. Tamberella v. Commissioner, 139 Fed. Appx. 319, (2d Cir. 2005)(focus on intent of payor);
Chamberlain v. United States, 401 F.3d 335 (5th Cir. La. 2005) (prejudgment interest taxable regardless of
characterization of parties or state law); Greer v. United States, 207 F.3d 322, 329 (6th Cir. 2000) (focus on
motivation behind settlement); Forest v. Commissioner, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 3312 (1st Cir. 1996) (focus
on facts and circumstances); Delaney v. Commissioner, 99 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 1996) (ignoring party
allocation and focusing on facts); Brabson v. United States, 73 F.3d 1040 (10th Cir. Colo. 1996)
(prejudgment interest taxable regardless of characterization); Robinson v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 116
(1994), rev’d in part on other grounds, 70 F.3d 34 (5th Cir. 1995) (rejecting party’s allocation of 95% of
settlement proceeds to excludible claims when earlier jury verdict awarded mostly punitive damages);
Bagley v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 396 (1995) (same).
56
See e.g. Bagley v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 396 (1995) (Ignoring parties’ allocation between excludible
personal injuries and non-excludible emotional distress); Robinson v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 116 (1994)
(ignoring allocation made in stipulated court-approved settlement).
57
Revenue Act of 1918, Child Labor Tax Acts, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 213(b), 40 Stat 1057, 1065 (1919).
58
See H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at 104, 140, 451 (1989) (emphasis added).
59
See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, H.R. REP. NO. 101-386, at 99 (1989).
60
See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, § 7641, PUB. LAW NO. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106 (1989).
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In 1992, the Court in Burke v. U.S.61 held that an award of damages under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for illegal discrimination on the basis of gender did
not constitute a “personal injury” award, and thus could not be excluded from income,
because the statutory remedy was limited to back pay and injunctive relief rather than
compensating for a tort-type personal injury.
Three years later, in Commissioner v. Schleier,62 the Court held that an award of
back pay and liquidated damages under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) was not “on account of” a personal injury, and was thus not excluded from
income, because neither remedy was given in lieu of – to compensate for – a personal
injury. The award was given either to compensate for taxable income (lost wages) or as a
statutory remedy without regard to whether or not the plaintiff suffered a personal injury.
In 1996, following these two highly-complex interpretations of the statutory
language, the House of Representatives again proposed to limit the exclusion in IRC
section 104(a)(2) to “physical injuries or physical sickness.” According to the House
Committee Report proposing to add the new “physical injury or physical sickness”
language, the Committee believed that the change was needed because non-physical
injury awards generally compensate for lost profits and wages that would otherwise have
been taxable. The Committee felt that attempting to attribute the reason for the award
(lost wages or lost personal enjoyment) has resulted in “substantial litigation, including
two Supreme Court cases within the last four years.”63 The Committee concluded that
“The taxation of damages received in cases not involving physical injury or physical
sickness should not depend on the type of claim made.”64 The “physical” requirement,
and the language saying that emotional injuries would not meet the “physical”
requirement, were thus added to simplify the application of the rule.
In explaining the new physical injury requirement, the Committee focused on the
origin of the claim and the proximity of the physical injury to the wrongful act:
If an action has its origin in a physical injury or physical sickness,
then all damages (other than punitive damages) that flow therefrom
are treated as payments received on account of physical injury or
physical sickness whether or not the recipient of the damages is the
injured party. . . . The bill also specifically provides that
emotional distress is not considered a physical injury or
physical sickness. [footnote 24 deleted] Thus, the exclusion from
gross income does not apply to any damages received (other than
for medical expenses as discussed below) based on a claim of
employment discrimination or injury to reputation accompanied
61

504 U.S. 229 (1992).
515 U.S. 323 (1995).
63
House Committee Report on Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, H.R. REP. NO. 104- 586, at 143
(1996), 1996-3 C.B. 331, 481 (“Damages received on a claim not involving a physical injury or physical
sickness are generally to compensate the claimant for lost profits or lost wages that would otherwise be
included in taxable income. The confusion as to the tax treatment of damages received in cases not
involving physical injury or physical sickness has led to substantial litigation, including two Supreme Court
cases within the last four years. The taxation of damages received in cases not involving a physical injury
or physical sickness should not depend on the type of claim made.”).
64
Id.
62
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by a claim of emotional distress. Because all damages received on
account of physical injury or physical sickness are excludable from
gross income, the exclusion from gross income applies to any
damages received based on a claim of emotional distress that is
attributable to a physical injury or physical sickness.65
In Footnote 24 of its report, the House Committee said “the Committee intends that the
term emotional distress includes physical symptoms (e.g., insomnia, headaches,
stomach disorders) which may result from such emotional distress.”66 The House
Committee that proposed adding the “physical” requirement thus specifically intended
that physical manifestations of emotional distress not be treated as a “physical injury or
physical sickness.” There must be a proximate physical impact causing an immediate
physical injury or sickness (although not necessarily to the plaintiff) in order to have a
“physical injury or physical sickness” from which excludible damages could flow.
The Senate version of the bill eliminated the exclusion for all punitive damages,
rather than just punitive damages arising out of non-physical injuries. However, the
Senate’s version did not accept the language proposed by the House of Representatives to
eliminate the exclusion for all damages recovered for non-physical injuries, whether
punitive, compensatory, or otherwise (other than the recovery of medical expenses).67
It is interesting to note that the change proposed by the Senate would have been
rendered moot by the Supreme Court’s later decision in O’Gilvie v. United States.68 The
Court in O’Gilvie interpreted the pre-1996 statute to provide no exclusion for punitive
damages, notwithstanding the specific language at the time limiting the exclusion only to
punitive damages arising from non-physical injuries.
While, as in 1989, the Senate did not initially accept the House version of the bill,
this time the Conference Committee agreed to the House version.69 The Conference
Committee report quoted much of the language from the House Report concerning the
reason for eliminating the exclusion for damages arising from emotional distress.70 The
language limiting the exclusion to amounts received on account of “physical injuries or
physical sickness,” and providing that “emotional distress shall not be treated as a
physical injury or physical sickness,” became law.71 In his signing statement, President
Clinton stated that he did not think damages for non-physical injury or sickness should be
65

Id. at 143-44 (emphasis added)
Id. (emphasis added).
67
See S. REP. NO. 104-281 at 97 (1996).
68
519 U.S. 79 (1996).
69
See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-737 at 300 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1677.
70
Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Conference Report to accompany H.R. 3448, H.R. CONF.
REP. 104-737, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1677, 1996 W.L. 443734 at 265 (1996) (“The House bill
also specifically provides that emotional distress is not considered a physical injury or physical sickness.
Thus, the exclusion from gross income does not apply to any damages received (other than for medical
expenses as discussed below) based on a claim of employment discrimination, or injury to reputation
accompanied by a claim of emotional distress. Because all damages received on account of physical injury
or physical sickness are excludable from gross income, the exclusion from gross income applies to any
damages received based on a claim of emotional distress that is attributable to physical injury or physical
sickness.”).
71
IRC §104(a) flush language, added by the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104188, 110 Stat. 1838 (1996).
66
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taxable, although he nevertheless signed the bill into law.72 Thus, the clear purpose of the
new “physical injury or physical sickness” requirement was to make all amounts received
for emotional distress damages, including amounts received on account of physical
manifestations arising out of that emotional distress, includible in income.
The numerous other Courts that have addressed the physical injury limitations
added by the 1996 amendments have recognized and applied the interpretation given by
the legislative history, focusing on whether the settling party made the payment on
account of a direct proximate physical injury or physical sickness (in which case there
would be exclusion) or as a result of physical manifestations from emotional distress (in
which case there would not be exclusion).73
The government has also issued an
72

Statement by President William J. Clinton Upon Signing H.R. 3448, P. 3, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1862, 1996
W.L. 648447 (1996) (“Finally, I have reservations about a provision in the Act which makes civil damages
based on nonphysical injury or illness taxable. Such damages are paid to compensate for injury, whether
physical or not, and are designed to make victims whole, not to enrich them. These damages should not be
considered a source of taxable income.”).
73
Lindsey v. Commissioner, 422 F.3d 684, 688-89 (8th Cir. 2005) (Business tort claim recoveries not
excludible because taxpayer’s “hypertension and stress-related symptoms, including periodic impotency,
insomnia, fatigue, occasional indigestion, and urinary incontinence. . . . relate to emotional distress, and not
to physical sickness.”); Johnson v. United States, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1224 n. 4 (D. Col. 2002) (“As
discrimination is not a physical injury. Plaintiff's claim would also fail on this basis.”); Goode v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2006-48 (T.C. 2006) (rejecting “physical injury” characterization in settlement
agreement, and holding that employee’s claimed “repeated, vehement verbal assaults . . . which caused him
physical pain and suffering” did not constitute physical injury); Vincent v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo
2005-95 (rejecting physical injury characterization in settlement agreement); Ndirika v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo 2004-250 (No credible evidence employment settlement to compensate for previous
miscarriage or pregnancy-related pain and suffering); Lindsey v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2004-113
(Hypertension leaving to “fatigability, occasional indigestion, and difficulty sleeping -- are the types of
injuries or sicknesses that Congress intended to be encompassed within the definition of emotional
distress.”); Amos v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2003-329 ($200,000 settlement payment to cameraman
allegedly injured by Dennis Rodman at basketball gain was for “physical injury or sickness,” because “Mr.
Rodman's dominant reason in paying the settlement amount at issue was to compensate petitioner for his
claimed physical injuries relating to the incident.”); Venable v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2003-240, 24
(Malicious prosecution claim does not give rise to physical injury or sickness); Shaltz v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo 2003-173 (Sexual harassment settlement not excludible because no evidence of physical injury,
only “depression, anxiety, stress, and recurrent past stressors” caused by “depression and trauma at
work.”); Henderson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2003-168 ($5,000 settlement of credit reporting claim
not excludible even if "life-threatening, pre-existing physical illness" exacerbated by the harm to his
personal reputation.”); Prasil v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2003-100 (Allegations of severe physical
manifestations from sex discrimination and harassment not sufficient to establish physical injury or
physical sickness); Witcher v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2002-292 (Physical manifestations caused by
defamation and business torts not personal physical injury or physical sickness); Medina v. Commissioner,
T.C. Summary Opinion 2003-148 (Settlement for wrongful termination due to pregnancy and resulting
disability not excludible because wrongful termination did not cause physical sickness); Dorroh v.
Commissioner, T.C. Summary Opinion 2003-93 (Petitioner’s employment discrimination settlement not on
account of personal physical injury suffered at work, which was covered by separate workers’
compensation claim); Emanoil & Magdalena Gantea v. Commissioner, T.C. Summary Opinion 2003-55
(settlement of injured employee’s claim for invasion of privacy not “on account of” the physical injury);
Nield v. Commissioner, T.C. Summary Opinion 2002-110 (No credible evidence that sex harassment
recovery on account of physical injury or sickness. Court rejected petitioner’s self-serving testimony that
unwelcome touching (elbow to breast) led to physical injury (bruising), and also rejected new allegation
that employer tackled petitioner in parking lot.); Reid v. Commissioner, T.C. Summary Opinion 2002-55
(Wrongful discharge recovery not on account of separate work-related injury covered by separate workers’
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administrative ruling concluding that there must be a contact resulting in “observable
bodily harms such as bruises, cuts, swelling, and bleeding” to constitute a physical injury
or physical sickness within the meaning of the statute.74 The court of appeals in Murphy
did not cite to any of these many authorities.
It is a straightforward matter to apply Congress’s intent in enacting the physical
injury requirement, as explained in the legislative history, to Ms. Murphy’s claim and
award. Ms. Murphy had physical manifestations from her emotional distress, but did not
suffer a physical injury – an impact – from which excludible damages could flow. The
court of appeals thus reached the correct decision – that Ms. Murphy could not exclude
her damages award under the statute, but it did so for the wrong reason. Ms. Murphy was
not entitled to exclude the award because she did not suffer a “physical injury,” since
physical manifestations of emotional distress do not meet the statutory requirement. The
court of appeals’ use of the “in lieu of what” tracing requirement from O’Gilvie v. United
States75 to attempt to determine what the award was compensating for,76 and its improper
focus on the language used in the heading of the award rather than the award’s intent,
ignored the intent of the 1996 amendment – as expressed in both the House and
Conference Committee Reports – to avoid the kinds of difficult tracing distinctions
suggested by the Court in Burke and Schleier for emotional injuries. Thus, whether or
not the award was, in fact, made to compensate Ms. Murphy for her physical
manifestations, and whether or not the Department of Labor hearing board adequately
described the basis for the award, is now irrelevant under the statute. It is curious that the
court of appeals in Murphy made no mention of the legislative history, because that
history had been correctly analyzed in the district court’s opinion in Murphy.77 Since Ms.
Murphy’s physical manifestations from her emotional injury did not constitute a
“personal physical injury or physical sickness” within the meaning of the statute, she was
not entitled to exclude the award.
D.

Without an Exclusion, Was Ms. Murphy Required to Include Her Award in
Gross Income?

Having properly determined, albeit for the wrong reasons,78 that Congress had not
allowed Ms. Murphy to exclude her emotional distress award under IRC section
compensation case). See also Febray v. Commissioner, 223 F.3d 1261, 1262 n. 1 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting
that physical injury requirement after 1996 amendments would have eliminated issue of excludability in
case involving recovery on account of injury to business reputation.).
74
Private Ltr. Rul. 200041022 (July 17, 2000) (unwelcome sexual harassment which included physical
touching that did not result in observable bodily harm would not constitute an excludible “personal physical
injury or sickness” within the meaning of IRC section 104(a)(2)).
75
519 U.S. 79 (1996), discussed supra beginning at note 43.
76
Murphy, 460 F.3d at 84.
77
Murphy v Internal Revenue Service, 362 F. Supp. 2d 206, 215 (D.D.C. 2005), rev’d 460 F.3d 79 (D.C.
Cir. 2006) (“Here, Murphy's mental anguish manifested into a physical problem, bruxism, but this was only
a symptom of her emotional distress, not the source of her claim. Plaintiff's emotional distress is not
"attributable to her physical injury; in fact, it is the other way around. Because the statute clearly provides
damages must be received "on account of personal physical injury or physical sickness," and because
mental pain and anguish and damage to reputation are not physical injuries, plaintiff's emotional distress
damages are not included within the statutory exemption under § 104(a)(2).”).
78
See supra Part III.C beginning at page 10.
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104(a)(2), the court of appeals proceeded to consider whether Congress had the
constitutional power to tax the award. Reaching back to what it determined to be the
meaning of “income” in 1913, when the 16th Amendment was enacted, the court of
appeals held that Congress lacked the constitutional power to tax Ms. Murphy’s award
because it was not “income.” The court of appeals then held that since Congress lacked
the power to tax Ms. Murphy’s award, IRC section 104(a)(2) must be unconstitutional.
The court of appeals missed an important step in its analysis – whether any
provision of the IRC required Ms. Murphy’s award to be included in income. Only
amounts which must be included in income are statutorily subject to tax. IRC section 61
requires all “income” to be included in gross income and thereby made subject to
taxation. Before considering whether the statute was constitutional, the court of appeals
should have determined whether Congress required the award to be included in income
under IRC section 61. If Congress lacked the power to tax Ms. Murphy’s award, it would
be the provision requiring the award to be included in income – IRC section 61 – that
would be unconstitutional, not the exclusion provision.
By failing to address the inclusion question, the court of appeals missed an
important and difficult legal question – whether an award could constitute “income”
under IRC section 61 (a necessary predicate to considering the constitutional question),
but not constitute income under the 16th Amendment, as the court of appeals ultimately
held. The court of appeals failed to address this apparent conundrum.
As discussed below, using the modern theories of statutory interpretation adopted
by the Supreme Court, the court of appeals could have properly reached the constitutional
question by holding that Ms. Murphy’s award was not “income” within the meaning of
IRC section 61, notwithstanding any original meaning attached to section 61 or its
predecessors by the original adopting Congresses. The court of appeals may have
properly reached the constitutional question, but its flawed analysis led to holding the
wrong statute unconstitutional for the wrong reason.
The court of appeals’ specific holding in Murphy, that IRC section 104(a)(2) is
unconstitutional,79 does not make logical sense. IRC Section 104(a)(2) is an exclusion
provision, not an inclusion provision.80 The change made by Congress in 1996, to
eliminate the exclusion for non-physical emotional distress damages recoveries, would
only cause such damages to be taxable if, without regard to IRC Section 104(a)(2), such
recoveries had to be included in income by some other provision. As currently written,
IRC section 104(a)(2) excludes from income damages on account of physical injury or
physical sickness, other than punitive damages. The court of appeals in Murphy was not
questioning the constitutionality of the existing exclusion contained in IRC section
104(a)(2). Rather, it was questioning the constitutionality of Congress’s attempt to
affirmatively tax Ms. Murphy’s compensatory non-physical injury recoveries. Therefore,
it was not the exclusion in IRC section 104(a)(2) that would be unconstitutional, but

79

Murphy, 460 F.3d at 92 (“insofar as § 104(a)(2) permits the taxation of compensation for personal injury,
which compensation is unrelated to lost wages or earnings, that provision is unconstitutional.”).
80
IRC § 104(a)(2) (“gross income does not include . . . (2) the amount of any damages (other than punitive
damages) received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on
account of personal physical injuries or physical sickness.”). The section says nothing about whether other
awards, such as Ms. Murphy’s award for non personal physical injury, are to be included in income.
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rather the provision requiring compensatory non-physical injury recoveries to be included
in income that would be subject to constitutional attack.
The court of appeals in Murphy was wrong to hold IRC section 104(a)(2)
unconstitutional. The Constitution does not require Congress to enact a specific
exclusion for all of the things that do not constitute “income” or that cannot otherwise
constitutionally be taxed. Rather, Congress has the affirmative duty to provide by statute
what items are subject to its taxing laws.
Instead of focusing on the exclusion in IRC section 104(a)(2), the court of appeals
in Murphy should have focused its attention on the inclusion provision in IRC section 61
– for taxpayers are only required to pay income taxes on amounts included in “gross
income” under IRC section 61.81 IRC section 61 provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means
all income from whatever source derived, including (but not
limited to) the following [15] items:82
Thus, as a technical matter, Ms. Murphy’s emotional distress and reputational damage
award would only be included in gross income if the award constituted “income” within
the meaning of IRC section 61.
The court of appeals in Murphy should have considered whether Ms. Murphy’s
award had to be included in income under the statute before considering whether the
statute was constitutional. Under the established maxim that constitutional questions are
to be avoided,83 a court can only reach a constitutional issue after first resolving the
statutory issue. The court of appeals in Murphy failed to specifically address whether
Congress had in fact statutorily required Ms. Murphy’s damages award to be included in
gross income, and thus subject to the income tax, before proceeding to the constitutional
issue.
When it eliminated the exclusion in IRC section 104(a)(2), Congress clearly
thought and intended that non-physical injury damages awards would be included in
income under IRC section 61. Congress’s intent to include in income emotional and
other non-physical injury awards was made clear in the legislative history of the
amendment.84 More importantly, Congress’s intent was also manifested by the
enactment of the statute itself. There would be no logical reason for Congress to limit the
exclusion in IRC section 104(a)(2) to “physical injuries and physical sickness,” or to
provide that emotional injuries would not constitute “physical injuries or physical
sickness,” if emotional and other non-physical injury recoveries were already excluded
from taxation because they were not “income.” If emotional injury recoveries were not
included in “income” under IRC section 61, the amendment to IRC section 104(a)(2)
81

IRC §1 imposes a tax on “taxable income.” See IRC §§ 1(a) (married individuals filing jointly and
surviving spouses); 1(b) (heads of households); 1(c) (unmarried individuals); 1(d) (married individuals
filing separately); 1(e) (estates and trusts). “’[T]axable income’ means gross income minus the deductions
allowed by this chapter.” IRC § 63. Gross income is defined in IRC section 61 as “all income from
whatever source derived.” IRC § 61(a). Thus, unless an item is included in “gross income,” it is not
subject to tax under the IRC, and only items that constitute “income” are included in gross income.
82
IRC §61(a) (2006).
83
See supra note 35..
84
See discussion supra beginning at note 63.
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would be a useless act. The doctrine of statutory interpretation known as the “rule
against surplusage” requires Congressional acts to be interpreted to have meaning.85
Therefore, both the amendment to IRC section 104(a)(2) itself and the legislative history
of the amendment show Congress’s intent that emotional and other non-physical injury
recoveries be included in income under IRC section 61.
On its face, the requirement to address the statutory issue before considering the
constitutional issue would put the court of appeals in a conundrum. On the one hand, the
court of appeals asserted that the word “income” has the same meaning in both the IRC
and the 16th Amendment.86 The court of appeals appears to have made this assertion to
support its argument that the government’s early administrative rulings on the scope of
the taxing statute should be read to limit Congress’s power under the 16th Amendment.87
However, if the word “income” means the same thing under both the IRC and the 16th
Amendment, then the Court could not find both that Ms. Murphy’s damages award
constituted “income” under the IRC (as it must to reach the constitutional question) while
not constituting “income” within the meaning of the 16th Amendment (as it must to be
unconstitutional). Rather than address the conundrum of Ms. Murphy’s award
constituting “income” under the IRC but not under the Constitution, the court of appeals
focused on the elimination of the exclusion in IRC section 104(a)(2) as the
unconstitutional act.
The solution to the conundrum is to recognize that that the word “income” in IRC
section 61 has evolved from the time that the predecessors of section 61 were enacted in
1913. Regardless of the original meaning of the word income when IRC section 61 and
its predecessors were enacted, Congress’s intent at the time it amended IRC section
104(a)(2) in 1996 should prospectively88 control the interpretation of the ambiguous word
“income” in IRC section 61.
85

See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip P. Frickey and Elizabeth Garrett, Legislation and Statutory
Interpretation, p. 266 (Foundation Press 2000) (referring to the doctrine as “The Rule Against Surplusage”)
(hereafter “Legislation and Statutory Interpretation”).
86
See supra note 18.
87
Murphy, 460 F.3d at 88-90 (“Fortunately, we need not rely solely upon the wisdom and beneficence of
the Congress, for, when the Sixteenth Amendment was drafted, the word “incomes” had well understood
limits. . . . We concur . . . that the Attorney General’s 1918 opinion and the Treasury Department’s ruling
of the same year strongly suggest that the term “incomes” as used in the Sixteenth Amendment does not
extend to monies received solely in compensation for personal injury and unrelated to lost wages or
earnings”).
88
The dynamic interpretation of statutory meaning discussed infra at note 91, applies only prospectively,
because Congress generally legislates prospectively. See Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440, 445 (1928)
(retroactive application of gift tax to gifts made before its enactment violates due process of law); Calder v.
Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798) (recognizing unjustness of retrospective laws); but see Petitioner v. Carlton,
512 U.S. 26 (1994) (validating explicit retroactivity provision in statute where government has a
“legitimate purpose” for imposing a “modest period of retroactivity.”). The corollary rule against
retroactive legislative interpretations of earlier statutes has also been recognized by the Supreme Court.
For example, in O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79 (1996), the taxpayer argued that Congress’s 1989
amendment to section 104(a)(2), which eliminated an exclusion for “punitive damages not arising out of
physical injury or physical sickness,” implicitly recognized that the taxpayer’s 1988 award of punitive
damages arising out of a physical injury should be excluded from income. The Court rejected the
taxpayer’s argument because the taxpayer’s settlement occurred and was governed by the statute in effect
in 1988, before the 1989 amendment was made. The Court held that Congress’s 1989 interpretation of a
1988 statute was irrelevant, because the meaning of the 1988 statute was governed by the interpretation of
the earlier enacting Congress. The Court said “the view of a later Congress cannot control the
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Professors Eskridge, Frickey and Garrett, in their hornbook on statutory
interpretation, have recognized that “[s]tatutory amendments can create new textual
meaning as an indirect as well as a direct result of the new text that they add to the
statutory scheme.”89 This understanding of the dynamic nature of statutory construction
– that the meaning of an earlier statute can be prospectively governed not by the intent of
the original enacting Congress, but by the intent of a later Congress as expressed in an
enactment or amendment to the statutory scheme, was recognized by the Court, including
its three strictest constructionists, in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools.90 The
facts of Franklin are somewhat complicated. In 1972, Congress enacted Title IX, which
prohibited sex discrimination in many schools.91 In Cannon v. University of Chicago,92
the Supreme Court determined that private parties had an implied right of action under
Title IX. In 1986, Congress amended Title IX to abrogate the sovereign immunity of
state governments for private suits “to the same extent . . . [as] any public or private
entity other than a State.”93 In the 1986 amendments, Congress implicitly recognized the
existence of a private right of action under Title IX, as had been determined by the 1979
Supreme Court decision in Cannon.
The issue in Franklin was whether a plaintiff, who had an implied private right of
action under Cannon, could sue for damages or only back pay and prospective relief.
The defendants argued that the original statute and legislative history did not specifically
authorize damages recoveries, which is not surprising since the original statute did not
expressly provide for a private right of action in the first place. The Supreme Court in
Franklin first applied a general presumption that the courts would infer all available
remedies when Congress establishes a private right of action.94 More importantly, the
Supreme Court in Franklin then noted that subsequent statutory amendments in 1986
broadened the waiver of sovereign immunity, and did not restrict the remedy. The Court
viewed these subsequent amendments as validating the Supreme Court’s decision in
Cannon that Congress intended a private right of action under Title IX, and also to show
an intent not to limit the available remedy.95 The majority opinion thus recognized that
the 1986 Congress’s intent regarding the meaning of an earlier 1972 statute, as evidenced
by statutory amendments made in 1986 to other related provisions, is effective to define
the meaning of the 1972 statute.
Even more interesting is the concurrence in Franklin written by Justice Scalia for
the three strictest constructionists then on the court – Justices Scalia, Rehnquist and
interpretation of an earlier enacted statute.” In support of this rule, the Court cited two other cases holding
that a Congressional interpretation of an earlier statute was not effective retroactively. United States v.
Price, 361 U.S. 304, 331-32 (1960) (“the views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for
inferring the intent of an earlier one.”); Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473. 479-80 (1940) (Statute forbidding a
certain deduction does not necessarily show that previous law would have authorized deduction.). These
authorities do not address the prospective effect of a Congressional amendment that interprets a prior
statute.
89
Legislation and Statutory Interpretation, supra note 85 at 268.
90
503 U.S. 60 (1992)
91
Educational Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 373 (codified, as amended, at 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681).
92
441 U.S. 677 (1979),
93
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7.
94
Franklin, at 66.
95
Franklin at 72-73.

18

Thomas. The trio strongly disagreed both with the Court’s prior decision in Cannon
implying a private right of action under Title IX, and with the presumption in the
majority opinion in Franklin that the broadest possible remedies should accompany an
implied private right of action.96 Nevertheless, the strict constructionists concurred in the
result because Congress, in the subsequent amendments to Title IX, had shown its intent
to acquiesce in Cannon and to permit a damages remedy. As Justice Scalia stated:
The Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(2), must
be read, in my view, not only "as a validation of Cannon's holding," but also as
an implicit acknowledgment that damages are available. I therefore concur in
the judgment.97

The entire Court thus recognized that later Congressional amendments to one statute can
be effective in prospectively defining the meaning of another earlier provision of the
same statutory scheme.
This dynamic approach to statutory construction makes good sense, because
Congress had the power to amend the original statute. It did not amend the original
statute because it did not know that an amendment would be necessary. Because it had
the power to amend the original statute, Congress’s interpretation of the meaning of the
original statute in an enacted amendment should be effective as a legislative act that
prospectively defines the earlier statute’s meaning. In a sense, by amending one part of a
legislative scheme, the later Congress is reenacting the remaining parts of the scheme,
and these remaining parts should therefore be governed by the new Congress’s intent as
expressed in the statutory amendment.98
Professors Eskridge, Frickey and Garrett have recognized that the rule of implied
statutory amendments can conflict with the rule against implied repeals of un-amended
earlier statutes if the earlier statute had a clear meaning, and was not itself amended. The
rule against implied repeals protects against inferring an intent to Congress’s inaction that
is counter-intuitive – for if Congress intended to change the meaning of a clear statute, it
could easily amend the statute. Professors Eskridge, Frickey and Garret conclude that
“The rule against implied repeals should be limited to cases where the earlier statute had
a relatively clear and longstanding meaning and the later statute is ambiguous enough to
have a neutral interpreter pause.”99 The rule against implied repeals should not apply to
ambiguous statutes, because Congress would not know of the need to make the
amendment. Instead of protecting congressional intent from wrongful judicial inferences,
96
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applying the rule against implied repeals to ambiguous statutes would ignore clear
congressional intent. Therefore, as a matter of statutory construction, Congress’s intent
regarding the meaning of ambiguous corollary statutes is governed prospectively by
Congress’s intent at the time the statutory scheme is changed.
The same analysis that was recognized by the Court in Franklin should apply in
Murphy. Congress intended emotional and other non-physical damages recoveries to be
included in “income” under IRC section 61 when it amended IRC section 104(a)(2) to
eliminate the exclusion. This was clear both from the legislative history, which
specifically discussed the reason for requiring emotional injury recoveries to be included
in income,100 and from the intent manifest in the statutory amendment itself.101
Therefore, both the amendment to IRC section 104(a)(2) itself and the legislative history
of the amendment show Congress’s intent that emotional and other non-physical injury
recoveries be included in income under IRC section 61.
Because Congress clearly intended in its amendment to IRC section 104(a)(2) in
1996 for non-physical injury recoveries be included in income, that intent should govern
the meaning of the ambiguous term in section 61 prospectively. The courts would be
ignoring the will of a Congress that had the power and intent to require Ms. Murphy’s to
include her emotional distress damages recovery in income if they held that the her award
was not “income” within the historic meaning of IRC § 61. The courts should therefore
accept the meaning of IRC section 61 that Congress intended when it amended the
statutory scheme in 1996 – to require Ms. Murphy to include her emotional and
reputational damages award in income.
Therefore, the court of appeals in Murphy should have held that Ms. Murphy’s
award constituted “income” under IRC section 61 because of Congress’s manifested
intent when it amended IRC section 104(a)(2) in 1996. The court of appeals should also
have recognized that the word “income” in IRC section 61, as interpreted by Congress in
the 1996 amendment to IRC section 104(a)(2), may not mean the same thing as “income”
under the 16th Amendment. Only by recognizing a distinction between the meaning of
the word “income” under the statute and the constitutional amendment could the court
properly consider the constitutional issue. The court of appeals erred in holding the
exclusion contained in IRC section 104(a)(2) unconstitutional rather than focusing on the
inclusion required by IRC section 61. However, the court of appeals correctly concluded
that Ms. Murphy’s award was statutorily taxable, and therefore it was proper for the court
of appeals to consider whether the statute was constitutional.
IV.
A.

The Constitutional Questions.

Congress Had the Power to Tax Ms. Murphy’s Damages Award Without
the 16th Amendment.

The court of appeals in Murphy began its constitutional analysis by stating that
“[t]he constitutional power of the Congress to tax income is provided in the Sixteenth
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See discussion supra beginning at note 84
See discussion supra in the paragraph following note 84.
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Amendment, ratified in 1913.”102 This is an erroneous statement of law, and
demonstrates a serious misunderstanding of income tax history.
It is true that Congress has those powers, and only those powers, authorized by
the Constitution. In recognizing the power of judicial review, the Supreme Court in the
famous case of Marbury v. Madison said “The powers of the legislature are defined and
limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken or forgotten, the constitution is
written."103 Therefore, every act of Congress must be permitted explicitly or implicitly
by the Constitution. There is a strong presumption that congressional statutes are
constitutional, and that presumption is only to be overcome “upon a plain showing that
Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds.”104
However, a court cannot declare a law unconstitutional merely because one
provision of the Constitution does not authorize the law if there is another provision in
the Constitution that does authorize it. The proper constitutional question is whether
Congress had the power under any provision of the constitution to tax Ms. Murphy’s
emotional and reputational damage award. In order to determine whether the
Constitution gives to Congress the power to enact a law, “[i]t is, therefore, necessary to
search the Constitution to ascertain whether or not the power is conferred.”105 “The
burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable
basis which might support it."106
Even if the court of appeals was correct when it held that Ms. Murphy’s
emotional and reputational damages award was not “income” within the meaning of the
16th Amendment, a holding that is questioned below,107 the court of appeals in Murphy
should have considered whether other provisions of the Constitution would permit
Congress to tax the award.
A proper historical review of Congress’s taxing power reveals that Congress had
the constitutional power to tax Ms. Murphy’s damages award even if it was not “income”
within the meaning of the 16th Amendment. Congress’s constitutional power to both tax
property transactions and human capital had long been recognized before the 16th
Amendment was adopted and has never seriously been questioned. The court of appeals’
statement, that Congress’s power to tax income derives from the 16th Amendment, shows
a great misunderstanding of both the Constitution and the judicial history of income
taxation. What follows is a thorough-going review of tax history which will demonstrate
the error made by the court of appeals in Murphy in focusing solely on the 16th
Amendment.
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(1)

The Source of Congress’s Constitutional Power to Tax.

Although the court of appeals in Murphy contended otherwise,108 Congress’s
power to impose income taxes does not derive from the 16th Amendment. Rather, it
derives from the plenary power given to Congress in Article I of the Constitution to
impose all forms of taxation, other than taxes on exports.109 The Constitution contains
two provisions restricting the manner in which Congress can exercise its plenary power
of taxation. The first provision requires that “duties, imposts and excises” be uniform:
“Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises . . . but all Duties, Imposts and
Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.”110
The uniformity requirement has long been interpreted to require only that the tax law not
discriminate geographically.111
The second restriction, and the more important one for this paper, requires that
capitation and direct taxes be apportioned. The apportionment requirement was
contained in two clauses: “No capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in
Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken”112 and
“Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states."113
It is difficult to administer an apportioned tax other than capitation taxes.114
Apportionment requires that the share of the total federal tax liability paid by the citizens
of each state be proportional to the relative population of each state.115 Apportionment
generally requires a two-step approach, in which each state’s share of the total revenue
108
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desired is first allocated according to state population, and then the tax rates for the
citizens of each state are set. The result will almost always be different rates of tax in
each state, because the tax base in each state will not be proportional to population.
The apportionment requirement for direct taxes arose out of the debate over
whether slaves would be counted in the state’s population for determining the number of
representatives each state would have in the House of Representatives. Gouverneur
Morris said that Pennsylvania “will never agree to a representation of Negroes,"116and
Mr. Davie, in turn, said that North Carolina would never confederate on any terms that
did not rate them [slaves] at least as 3/5.”117 Professor Bruce Ackerman explained how
the great compromise over taxation, representation and slavery was reached:118
As the Convention struggled to avoid dissolution,
Gouverneur Morris took the first constructive step: If the
South insisted upon extra representation for its slaves, why
not require it to pay a price at tax time? On Thursday, July
12, he moved that "taxation shall be in proportion to
Representation."119 However, after a discussion recognizing
the administrative difficulty of apportioning all taxes,
Gouverneur Morris amended his proposal to limit the
apportionment requirement to direct taxes.120
There was, however, no discussion at the convention as to the precise meaning of
the term “direct taxes.”121 Professor Bruce Ackerman believes that any attempt to define
the term would have been “picking at a sore wound” and that the delegates thought it
better to leave the definition to the future.122
Except for taxes on exports which was strictly forbidden, these two limitations –
uniformity for duties, imposts and excises, and apportionment for direct taxes – are the
only specific restrictions contained in the Constitution on Congress’s power to tax. Both
are procedural restrictions on the method used to impose taxes, not substantive
limitations on Congress’s power to impose taxes.123 However, because in practice it
would be so difficult to administer and politically justify an apportioned tax, the
procedural restriction of apportionment would likely prevent Congress from imposing
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direct taxes in many circumstances.124 Thus, it is important to determine the meaning of
“direct taxes” in order to determine the constitutionality of an unapportioned tax.
(2)

Early Judicial Interpretations of the Direct Taxing Clause.

The meaning of “direct tax” has been the subject of debate in the Courts for more
than 200 years,125 and remains a source of debate within the academy today.126 While
there are many conflicting theories about the word’s original meaning to the drafters,
adopters and ratifiers of the constitution,127 the following discussion focuses on judicial
interpretations rather than on historical speculations. A careful review of the historical
development will demonstrate the Murphy court’s error in assuming that Congress’s
power to tax an emotional injury award derives solely from the 16th Amendment of the
Constitution, and in holding that the tax is unconstitutional because it is not within the
Amendment’s embrace. Indeed, the following discussion will show that even without the
16th Amendment, Congress would have the constitutional power to impose a uniform tax
on personal injury awards and settlements such as the one obtained by Ms. Murphy. The
Murphy court’s speculation that a compensatory award is not within the 16th Amendment
– a very questionable conclusion based on dubious evidence128 – is irrelevant if Congress
had the Constitutional power to tax the award outside of the 16th Amendment.
The first great tax case to consider the direct taxing clause was decided by the
United States Supreme Court in 1796. In 1794, Congress passed a tax on “carriages for
the conveyance of persons, varying from $1 to $10.”129 Daniel Hylton, who claimed to
own 125 carriages for his own personal use, was fined when he failed to pay the tax,130
Although the procedural history is dim, Mr. Hylton’s challenge to the tax was heard by
the United States Supreme Court. Mr. Hylton claimed that the carriage tax was an
unconstitutional unapportioned direct tax.131
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Professor Erik M. Jenson has argued that the case was set-up by anti-federalists
seeking to challenge the government’s taxing authority.132 In order to meet the
jurisdictional requirements, Mr. Hylton claimed to own 175 chariots “for his own
separate use, and not to let out to hire, or for the conveyance of persons for hire”133 –
more than existed at the time, according to one early commentator, in the entire State of
Virginia.134 Professor Jensen claims that the jurisdictional defects were overlooked by a
federalist bench seeking to establish Congress’s broad taxing power.135 Alexander
Hamilton, then the former Secretary of the Treasury and the spiritual leader of the
federalists, personally argued before the Supreme Court that the tax should be upheld.136
The case was heard before the principal of judicial review had been established137 by four
Supreme Court justices, three of whom issued substantive separate opinions.
All of the justices agreed that the carriage tax was not a direct tax requiring
apportionment. They differed in dicta about the meaning of direct taxes. Justice Chase
accepted Alexander Hamilton’s argument that direct taxes are only those that can be
reasonably apportioned, and also stated that the tax could be justified as an indirect tax on
an expense. This expense theory was better developed by Justice Patterson. In dicta,
Justice Chase also stated his opinion, emphasizing that it was not a judicial opinion, that
there are only two kinds of direct taxes “to wit, a capitation, or poll tax, simply, without
regard to property, profession, or any other circumstances; and a tax on LAND. -- I doubt
whether a tax, by a general assessment of personal property, within the United States, is
included within the term direct tax.”138
Justice Patterson held “I never entertained a doubt, that the principal, I will not
say, the only, objects, that the framers of the Constitution contemplated as falling within
the rule of apportionment, were a capitation tax and a tax on land.”139 Justice Patterson
explained that the purpose of the direct taxing clause was to protect the southern states
whose citizens owned large tracts of low-value undeveloped land from being taxed on
their land at the same per acre rates as the citizens of northern states who had smaller
tracts of high-value developed lands.140 Justice Patterson also suggested a theoretical
132
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distinction between direct and indirect taxes. Quoting from Adam Smith’s The Wealth of
Nations, Justice Patterson argued that taxes imposed on expenses or consumption, such as
the portion of the carriage that is used up during the year, are indirect because they are a
circuitous method of taxing income.141 Presumably, this is also what Justice Chase was
referring to when he justified the Carriage Tax as a tax on an expense.142
Justice Iredell thought that only those taxes that could be apportioned without
creating unfair results within different states should be considered direct.143 He noted
that an apportioned tax on carriages would require owners in one state to pay a higher tax
than owners in another state because carriage ownership was not proportional to state
population.144 Thus, an apportioned carriage tax, he believed, would generate the absurd
result of differing taxation depending on the taxpayer’s state of residence. In addition,
Congress could not impose an apportioned carriage tax if there existed any state without
carriages, because there would be no way for that state’s residents to pay their share of
the total tax in proportion to population. Justice Iredell thought it better not to attempt to
define direct taxes since only a carriage tax was before the Court.145 Nevertheless, he
suggested that direct taxes might refer only to taxes on land or a product of land –
something that is fixed and present in every state.146
Justice Wilson wrote a two sentence opinion agreeing that the tax on carriages
was constitutional.147 Justice Cushing dissented because he had not participated in the
hearing of the case, and therefore could not render an opinion on it.148
It is difficult to glean a clear rule from Hylton, other than the precise holding that
a flat tax on carriages was held to be an indirect tax that did not need to be apportioned.
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However, the majority of the judges suggested that only land or capitation taxes, or
something very similar, would be considered direct.
Modern commentators strongly disagree about the precedental effect that Hylton
should have. One camp, exemplified by Professor Calvin Johnson, gives great weight to
the interpretation made by justices who were members of the founding generation, some
of whom even participated in the negotiations that led to the direct taxing clause.149 The
other camp, exemplified by Professor Erik Jensen, view Hylton as a phony political
opinion lacking a balanced analytical framework.150
The next case to be heard by the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality
of the first federal income tax, which was imposed during the civil war.151 In Pacific
Insurance Company v. Soule,152 the Court considered two issues. The first issue was
whether the tax on an insurance company’s income that had been received in coined
money could be computed and paid in depreciated legal tender currency, or whether the
additional value of coined money over the depreciated currency was also “income.”
After reviewing the taxing act, which required a separate accounting for income received
in coin and currency, the Court held that additional income was reportable when income
was received in coin and the tax paid in currency.153 The second question considered by
the Court was whether the income tax was a direct tax that failed to comply with the rules
of apportionment. The Court followed the theory expressed in Hylton that only taxes that
could be easily and fairly apportioned would be direct. Applying this theory to the tax on
an insurance company’s income, the Court said:
The consequences which would follow the apportionment
of the tax in question . . . must not be overlooked. They are
very obvious. Where such corporations are numerous and
rich, it might be light; where none exist, it could not be
collected; where they are few and poor, it would fall upon
them with such weight as to involve annihilation. It cannot
be supposed that the framers of the Constitution intended
that any tax should be apportioned, the collection of which
149
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on that principle would be attended with such results. The
consequences are fatal to the proposition. . . . [t]he tax [in
issue] is not a direct tax, but a duty or excise; that it was
obligatory on the plaintiff to pay it.
Shortly thereafter, in Veazie Bank v. Fenno,154 a 10% tax on the issuance by a
state or national banking association of bank notes was upheld against constitutional
challenge. Justice Chase pointed out that Congress had only previously adopted
apportioned taxes on real property and slaves, and that “taxes on personal property,
contracts, occupations, and the like, have never been regarded by Congress as proper
subjects of direct tax.”155 Justice Chase concluded that “It may be rightly affirmed,
therefore, that in the practical construction of the Constitution by Congress, direct taxes
have been limited to taxes on land and appurtenances, and taxes on polls, or capitation
taxes.”156 After reviewing James Madison’s notes from the constitutional convention,
Justice Chase concluded “All this . . . indicates, also, an understanding that direct taxes
were such as may be levied by capitation, and on lands and appurtenances; or, perhaps,
by valuation and assessment of personal property upon general lists.”157 Finally, after
reviewing the Court’s early holding in Hylton, and recent holding in Soule, Justice Chase
concluded that only taxes on land, capitation, polls, and possibly personal property upon
general lists would be considered direct, and therefore it “follows necessarily that the
power to tax without apportionment extends to all other objects.”158
Next, in Scholey v. Rew,159 the Supreme Court upheld a Civil War succession tax,
which applied to the real estate Mr. Scholey received under the will of his deceased wife.
The Court held that the tax was an excise on the transfer of property, not a tax on the real
estate itself. Interestingly, the Court also compared the succession tax to an income tax:
Taxes on lands, houses, and other permanent real estate
have always been deemed to be direct taxes, and capitation
taxes, by the express words of the Constitution, are within
the same category, but it never has been decided that any
other legal exactions for the support of the Federal
government fall within the condition. . . . Whether direct
taxes in the sense of the Constitution comprehend any other
tax than a capitation tax and a tax on land is a question not
absolutely decided, nor is it necessary to determine it in the
present case, as it is expressly decided that the term does
not include the tax on income, which cannot be
distinguished in principle from a succession tax such as
the one involved in the present controversy.160
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The Civil War income tax was challenged by an individual many years after its
enactment and repeal in Springer v. United States,161 and was again upheld.
The
taxpayer in Springer filed an income tax return, but refused to pay the assessed tax. The
tax collector therefore levied on the taxpayer’s real estate, purchased the property at a tax
lien sale, and sought to eject the taxpayer from the premises. The taxpayer then
challenged the tax assessment, levy, sale, and ejectment on due process and
apportionment grounds. Once again, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the tax
from constitutional challenge, relying on the lack of clarity from the constitutional
debates,162 the notes left behind by Alexander Hamilton from the Hylton case,163 the
letters of James Madison disagreeing with the Hylton case but recognizing that the courts
were unlikely to adopt his views,164 the prior practice of Congress in imposing taxes,165
and the recent decisions in Veazie, Soule and Scholey.166 The Court concluded: “that
direct taxes, within the meaning of the Constitution, are only capitation taxes, as
expressed in that instrument, and taxes on real estate; and that the tax of which the
plaintiff in error complains is within the category of an excise or duty.”167
The early courts had thus interpreted the direct taxing clause extremely narrowly,
allowing unapportioned taxes on the ownership of personal property, on inheritances, and
on the issuance of bank notes, and suggesting that only taxes on real property and
possibly general lists of personal property would be subject to apportionment.
(3)

The Direct Taxing Clause Under Pollock.

Congress enacted the first non-war income tax in 1894.168 Professor Bruce
Ackerman claims that the 1894 income tax, which was modeled after the civil war
income taxes that had been upheld in Soule and Springer, was imposed in the midst of a
class war catalyzed by the financial panic of 1893.169 The string of governmental
victories came to a screeching halt in the famous 1895 cases of Pollock v. Farmers' Loan
& Trust,170 in which the Court ultimately struck down the entire 1894 Act. Charles
Pollock, a shareholder in Farmers Loan and Trust Company, sued the company to prevent
it from paying taxes imposed under the 1894 Act on the income generated by the real and
personal property that the corporation owned.171 Mr. Pollock claimed that Congress
could not constitutionally tax the corporation’s income from real and personal property
161
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without apportionment,172 and could not constitutionally tax interest earned on the
corporation’s municipal bonds under implied federalism principles.173 Since Congress
purported to tax income from real and personal property in the 1894 Act, Mr. Pollock
sought a declaration that the 1894 Act was unconstitutional, and an injunction preventing
Farmers Loan & Trust from paying any of the income taxes.174
Chief Justice Fuller began his majority opinion in the first Pollock case by stating
“in the matter of taxation, the Constitution recognizes the two great classes of direct and
indirect taxes, and lays down two rules by which their imposition must be governed,
namely: The rule of apportionment as to direct taxes, and the rule of uniformity as to
duties, imposts and excises.”175 Chief Justice Fuller stated, essentially, that direct taxes
in common parlance are those that cannot be avoided by conduct – taxes on mere
ownership as opposed to taxes imposed on activities.176 However, Justice Fuller
recognized that the Constitution might apply a different definition. He therefore
proceeded to review the ambiguous constitutional debates, concluding initially that the
drafters understood direct taxes to include taxes on real and personal property and the
incomes therefrom.177
Justice Fuller then reviewed the Court’s prior cases. He distinguished Hylton,
Soule and Vesie as taxes on duties or excises (on the use of carriages, the operation of an
insurance company, and the circulation of bank notes, respectively).178 Justice Chase
distinguished Scholey as an excise on the transfer of property at death.179 Finally, the
Court struggled to distinguish the income tax in Springer by going back to the original
record to find “that the income . . . was in part professional as attorney-at-law and the rest
interest on United States bonds,” not from property.180
After reviewing the cases, the Court equivocated on whether a tax on income
from personal property would constitute a direct tax, concluding only “that the law in
question, so far as it levies a tax on the rents or income of real estate, is in violation of the
Constitution, and is invalid.”181 The Court, unanimously,182 agreed with Mr. Pollock that
the tax on municipal bond interest was unconstitutional under federalism principles.183
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Justice Field wrote a lengthy concurring opinion arguing that the entire tax act
should be declared unconstitutional. Justice Field contended that taxes on income from
non-property sources such as wages – which even he conceded constituted “duties,
imposts and excises” and thus required no apportionment – were not uniform because of
the modest progressive structure of the Act - the first $4,000 of income was exempted.
Justice Field saw the exemption as an attack on wealth, and as an invitation to class
warfare.184 To Justice Field, uniformity meant more than geographic uniformity, it
required all taxpayers to pay ratably.185 No other justice joined Justice Field in these
views. Justice White, joined by Justice Harlan, wrote a lengthy dissent arguing on the
basis of precedent that direct taxes should be limited to taxes on real property itself, and
should not cover taxes on income from real property.186
In Pollock 2,187 a five-to-four divided Supreme Court revisited the case and
expanded its ruling. The Court first held that a tax on income from personal property was
also a direct tax that had to be apportioned. The Court’s decision was supported
primarily by statements made by Alexander Hamilton in his papers regarding the Hylton
case, which had been published after his death,188 and on decisions of English courts.189
The Court stated that the tax in income from personal property was direct because the
taxpayer had no means of escape.190 However, this theory is highly questionable.
Taxpayers do not need to rent or sell their property – income generally results from
people engaging in transactions with their property, which is the usual province of an
excise. The Court treated the source of the income (from property) as controlling, rather
than considering whether the income arose out of a transaction.
After holding that the broad based tax on all income from real and personal
property was direct and had to be apportioned, the Court considered whether the tax act
as a whole should be declared unconstitutional, or whether the unconstitutional portions
(the tax on income from property and municipal bonds) should be severed from the
constitutional portions (which the Court characterized as a tax on incomes from
“business, privileges, or employments.”)191 The Court noted that most of the expected
184
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revenue from the 1894 Act was to come from the unconstitutional tax on income from
real and personal property, and only a small portion was to come from the constitutional
tax on other income, including wages and professional earnings.192 The Court held that
Congress would not have intended for the constitutional portions to survive alone, and
therefore it struck down the entire Act.193
Four justices joined a famous194 dissent written by Justice Harlan.195 The
dissenters distinguished between a tax on land and a tax on income from land, the former
being direct and reasonably subject to apportionment, while the latter should be treated as
an excise.196 The dissenters also argued that all taxes on personal property or income
therefrom should be treated as indirect,197 and that the decision as a whole was a threat to
the security of the country by effectively limiting the subjects of taxation.198
It is important to note that the Pollock majority recognized Congress’s power to
tax all types of income without apportionment other than taxes on real and personal
property or the income therefrom, including income from “business, privileges, or
employments.” There was no question raised by any of the judges in Pollock over
Congress’s power to tax wages and other revenues generated from what we today call
human capital. Indeed, Pollock implicitly recognized Congress’s ability to tax without
apportionment all sources of income not from real or personal property (or municipal
bonds).
privileges, or employments has assumed the guise of an excise tax and been sustained as such. Being of
opinion that so much of the sections of this law as lays a tax on income from real and personal property is
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(4)

The Direct Taxing Clause After Pollock and Before the 16th
Amendment.

The negative political reaction to the split decision in Pollock199 led quickly to
retreat. Four years after Pollock, in Knowlton v. Moore,200 the justices unanimously201
agreed that the War Revenue Act of 1898,202 which imposed an unapportioned tax with
progressive rates on legatees who receive property from a deceased person’s estate, was
constitutional. In an opinion by Justice White, one of the Pollock dissenters, the Court
first noted that the tax was not on property itself, but on the transfer of property from the
decedent to the legatees. The Court stated that inheritance taxes:
[A]re included officially under the general denomination of
indirect taxes . . . [because they] are considered as levied on the
“occasion of a particular isolated act.” This view of the inheritance
and legacy tax conforms to the official definition of indirect taxes,
among which inheritance and legacy taxes are classed, which
prevails in France at the present day. The definition is as follows:
“Direct taxes bear immediately upon persons, upon the possession
and enjoyments of rights; indirect taxes are levied upon the
happening of an event or an exchange.”203
This theory is very different from the theory underlying Pollock, which focused on
whether the source of the item subject to tax was property, rather than whether the item
subject to tax was generated from an “event or exchange.”
The Court in Knowlton also noted that a similar succession tax had been upheld in
Scholey.204 However, the Court had to address the tangle of authority created by the
interplay of Pollock and Scholey. The tangle was caused because Scholey, in upholding
the succession tax, had analogized it to an income tax – both of which according to
Scholey were indirect.205 The taxpayers in Knowlton argued that Scholey must have been
over-ruled by Pollock’s holding that taxes on income from property were direct and had
to be apportioned.206 The majority in Knowlton disagreed with the taxpayer’s argument,
holding that the precise holding in Scholey regarding succession taxes had in fact been
“reaffirmed” by the Pollock Court when it distinguished Scholey as dealing only with the
succession taxes that were before it. In essence, Pollock only rejected the dicta in
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Scholey regarding income taxes, and reaffirmed the holding regarding succession
taxes.207
The Court in Knowlton next rejected the taxpayer’s argument that since the
inheritance tax could not be shifted to another taxpayer it was a direct tax requiring
apportionment. Knowlton held that the Court in Pollock did not ground its decision on
the economic theory of shiftability.208 Rather, the Knowlton Court said that Pollock was
grounded on the theory that the tax on income from property was a tax on the property
itself. On the other hand, the inheritance tax in Knowlton was a duty or excise on the
transfer at death, not a tax on income, and therefore could be analyzed differently.
It is difficult to reconcile the theory used by the Court in Knowlton with Pollock’s
source rule, since the source of the inheritance tax in Knowlton, like the source of the
income tax in Pollock, was property. Although the Knowlton Court professed to
distinguish Pollock, its focus on the activity of transfer rather than the source of the item
being taxed marked a substantial theoretical departure. The theory used in Knowlton,
which focused on whether there was any activity triggering tax rather than on whether the
source of the item taxed was property, would have changed the result in Pollock. After
all, the corporate taxpayer in Pollock was engaged in activities (leasing property and
managing investments) that gave rise to the income that was subject to tax.
After concluding that the inheritance tax was an indirect duty or excise triggered
by the transfer of property at death, the Knowlton Court considered the taxpayer’s
argument that the tax was not uniform because of the $10,000 exemption and progressive
rate structure employed by the statute.209 The Court began by recognizing that many
states had rules requiring equality and uniformity in taxation that would have been
violated by the statute.210 The Court focused closely, however, on the constitutional
language requiring uniformity “throughout the United States.”
Considering the text, it is apparent that if the word "uniform"
means "equal and uniform" in the sense now asserted by the
opponents of the tax, the words "throughout the United States" are
deprived of all real significance, and sustaining the contention
207

Id. at 81.
Id. at 82 (“The fallacy is in the premise. It is true that in the income tax cases the theory of certain
economists by which direct and indirect taxes are classified with reference to the ability to shift the same
was adverted to. But this disputable theory was not the basis of the conclusion of the court. The
constitutional meaning of the word direct was the matter decided. Considering that the constitutional rule of
apportionment had its origin in the purpose to prevent taxes on persons solely because of their general
ownership of property from being levied by any other rule than that of apportionment, two things were
decided by the court: First, that no sound distinction existed between a tax levied on a person solely
because of his general ownership of real property, and the same tax imposed solely because of his general
ownership of personal property. Secondly, that the tax on the income derived from such property, real or
personal, was the legal equivalent of a direct tax on the property from which said income was derived, and
hence must be apportioned. These conclusions, however, lend no support to the contention that it was
decided that duties, imposts and excises which are not the essential equivalent of a tax on property
generally, real or personal, solely because of its ownership, must be converted into direct taxes, because it
is conceived that it would be demonstrated by a close analysis that they could not be shifted from the
person upon whom they first fall.”).
209
Id. at 83-84.
210
Id. at 84.
208

34

must hence lead to a disregard of the elementary canon of
construction which requires that effect be given to each word of
the Constitution.211
The Court therefore adopted a geographic definition of uniformity, suggesting that only a
duty, impost or excise that discriminated on its face depending on the geographic location
of the taxpayer would lack uniformity.
In Thomas v. United States,212 the Court again retreated from Pollock by holding
that a tax on the transfer of stock certificates was indirect. Mr. Thomas, a stockbroker,
who had been criminally indicted and convicted for failing to pay the tax, argued that the
tax was an unapportioned direct tax and therefore invalid. In a unanimous opinion by
Justice Fuller, the author of Pollock, upholding the conviction, the Court said:
There is no occasion to attempt to confine the words duties,
imposts and excises to the limits of precise definition. We think
that they were used comprehensively to cover customs and excise
duties imposed on importation, consumption, manufacture and sale
of certain commodities, privileges, particular business transactions,
vocations, occupations and the like. Taxes of this sort have been
repeatedly sustained by this court, and distinguished from direct
taxes under the Constitution.213
The tax in Thomas was imposed on an item of personal property, as in Pollock 2,
yet the Court looked not to the source or base of the tax – personal property in the
form of stock, but to the acts giving rise to the tax – the transfer of personal
property. In attempting to explain its ruling in Thomas, the Court fell back on the
transactional concept it had expressed in Knowlton, and also mentioned a new
second theory – corporate privilege – that would soon be expanded:
The sale of stocks is a particular business transaction in the
exercise of the privilege afforded by the laws in respect to
corporations of disposing of property in the form of
certificates. The stamp duty is contingent on the happening
of the event of sale, and the element of absolute and
unavoidable demand is lacking. As such it falls, as stamp
taxes ordinarily do, within the second class of the forms of
taxation.214
As with Knowlton, the theory used by the Court in Thomas is difficult to reconcile
with the theory used by the Court in Pollock. Why, for example, would a tax on the
income generated by a sale of stock be direct under Pollock, while a tax on the gross
proceeds from the sale of stock would be indirect under Thomas? The only way to
211

Id. at 87.
192 U.S. 363 (1904).
213
Id. at 370.
214
Id. at 371.
212

35

reconcile these cases is to suggest that a tax on income from property is more direct than
a tax on the property itself. The absurdity of the proposition is manifest, and shows that
the standards used by the Court were changing.
In the same year as Thomas, the Court in Spreckels Sugar Refining Co. v.
McClain215 upheld a tax on the gross proceeds from the sale of sugar. The Court, in a
unanimous decision by Justice Harlan, a Pollock dissenter, held that the tax was an excise
on the business of refining sugar, and not a direct tax on property ownership.216 The
Court emphasized that Congress in the statute called the tax a “special excise.” Because
Congress labeled it an excise, said the Court, “it must be assumed, for what it is worth,
that Congress had no purpose to exceed its powers under the Constitution, but only to
exercise the authority granted to it of laying and collecting excises.”217 The Spreckels
Court disposed of Pollock, which it called The Income Tax Cases, in two sentences,
saying that the Court there said that it was not commenting on “‘gains or profits from
business, privileges or employments, in view of the instances in which taxation on
business, privileges or employments has assumed the guise of an excise tax and been
sustained as such.’"218 But of course the question in Pollock was whether income from
an investment business could constitutionally be taxed. Once again, the Spreckels
Court’s underlying theory – focusing on the identity or activities of the taxpayer rather
than the source of the item taxed – was a marked departure from the Court’s theory in
Pollock, and would have changed the result there.
Taking the hint from Spreckels and Thomas that a tax on the privilege of doing
business in corporate form would be a valid excise, Congress passed a new corporate
income tax in 1909.219 The 1909 law imposed “a special excise tax with respect to the
carrying on or doing business by such corporation . . . equivalent to one per centum upon
the entire net income over and above five thousand dollars received by it from all sources
during the year.” Only dividends received by one corporation from another who had
already paid the tax were excluded.220
The 1909 Corporate Income Tax was upheld by the Court as a valid excise in
Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.,221 a unanimous opinion written by Justice Day. As in the other
post-Pollock cases, the Court again emphasized Congress’s stated purpose to impose an
excise rather than a direct tax.222 In distinguishing Pollock, the Court stated:
215
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In the present case the tax is not payable unless there be a carrying
on or doing of business in the designated capacity, and this is made
the occasion for the tax, measured by the standard prescribed. The
difference between the acts is not merely nominal, but rests upon
substantial differences between the mere ownership of property
and the actual doing of business in a certain way.223
Was the income earned by the corporation in Pollock not the result of “actual doing of
business in a certain way?” Indeed, the Court in Flint considered the objections of real
estate companies (including one whose only asset was a hotel), and ruled that such
entities could be taxed because they were engaged in business activities:
We think it is clear that corporations organized for the purpose of
doing business, and actually engaged in such activities as leasing
property, collecting rents, managing office buildings, making
investments of profits, or leasing ore lands and collecting royalties,
managing wharves, dividing profits, and in some cases investing
the surplus, are engaged in business within the meaning of this
statute, and in the capacity necessary to make such organizations
subject to the law.224
One could surmise that the only real basis for the Court in Flint to distinguish Pollock
was Congress’s statement in the 1909 statute calling the tax an “excise.” Surely
Congress’s constitutional power to tax could not depend merely on Congress making a
self-serving statement in the statute. Despite the sophistry, by the time of Flint the
standard had changed from focusing on the source of the income to focusing on whether
or not the income came from an activity.
In Zonne v. Minneapolis Syndicate,225 a case argued at the same time as Flint but
decided later,226 the Court held that a corporation, which had leased all of its property to a
single lessee for 130 years, and had amended its charger to permit it to own only the
property subject to the lease, was not “doing business” and therefore was not subject to
the Corporate Tax Law of 1909. The Court’s decision in Zonne was based on the
language of the statute, not on any constitutional limitation on Congress’s power to tax.
Yet, the specter of Pollock hung over the decision, for without sufficient business activity
the new constitutional theory, under which taxes on income from business activities
constitute “duties or excises,” would not logically apply.227
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in business, nor upon the property of the corporation, but upon the doing of corporate or insurance business
and with respect to the carrying on thereof.”).
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Id. at 150.
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Id. at 171.
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220 U.S. 187 (1911).
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See McCoach v. Minehill & S. H. R. Co., 228 U.S. 295, 310 (1913).
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The Court in McCouch v. Minehill, 228 U.S. 295 (1913), followed Zonne in holding that a railroad that
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Flint was followed in Stratton's Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert,228 where the court
distinguished between a broad income tax as in Pollock, and an excise tax on a
corporation engaged in business that is measured by income.229 The Court in Stratton’s
made some comments about the distinction between a tax on business activity and a tax
on property that would later be used by the Court to define the meaning of “income”
under the 16th Amendment:230
The sale outright of a mining property might be fairly described as
a mere conversion of the capital from land into money. But when a
company is digging pits, sinking shafts, tunneling, drifting,
stoping, drilling, blasting, and hoisting ores, it is employing capital
and labor in transmuting a part of the realty into personalty, and
putting it into marketable form. The very process of mining is, in a
sense, equivalent in its results to a manufacturing process. And,
however the operation shall be described, the transaction in
indubitably "business" within the fair meaning of the act of 1909;
and the gains derived from it are properly and strictly the income
from that business; for "income" may be defined as the gain
derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined, and
here we have combined operations of capital and labor.231
Beginning in 1909 there was strong support in Congress for enacting a new
broad-based income tax with which to challenge Pollock head-on. However, President
Taft sought to avoid the dispute by proposing a compromise - a constitutional amendment
that would permit a broad based income tax without apportionment.232 The compromise
led to the enactment of the 16th Amendment in 1913.
The courts never fully developed the distinction between direct and indirect
taxation because Congress passed and the States adopted the 16th Amendment to the
United States Constitution in 1913. However, it is important to recognize that the Court
had retreated from the theory it had used in Pollock – that Congress could not, without
apportionment, tax income from property because it would constitute a direct tax on the
property itself. Instead, the post-Pollock cases focused on the conduct of the taxpayer
(and to some extent on the identity of the taxpayer)233 rather than the source of the
revenue, and specifically upheld the 1909 corporate income tax in situations that would
not have survived under the theory utilized in Pollock.
meaning of the Corporate Tax Law of 1909. Three dissenters argued that the continuing investment
activities were enough to constitute the carrying on of a business.
228
231 U.S. 399 (1913).
229
Id. at 416-17 (“Congress in exercising the right to tax a legitimate subject of taxation as a franchise or
privilege, was not debarred by the Constitution from measuring the taxation by the total income, although
derived in part from property which, considered by itself, was not taxable.”).
230
See discussion of Eisner v. McComber, infra beginning at note 354.
231
Id. at 414-15 (emphasis added).
232
The history of the negotiations leading to a constitutional amendment are set forth in Ackerman,
Taxation and the Constitution, supra note 116, at 34-39.
233
The Court’s identity theory suggested that Congress would have the power to tax a corporation simply
because it was permitted to exist and conduct business, that its corporate existence might be enough to
categorize a tax imposed on a corporation engaged in business as an excise.
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Moreover, all of the early cases, including Pollock, recognized that Congress
always possessed the power to tax income from what we call today human capital, such
as wages, without apportionment.234 Pollock only questioned the Court’s ability to tax
income from real or personal property without apportionment. What remained of Pollock
at the time of the adoption of the 16th Amendment was a prohibition against imposing
unapportioned taxes on the mere ownership of real or personal property, or on income
arising solely out of that mere ownership, absent transactional activity triggering the tax.
It is also important to note that the period following Pollock and before the
adoption of the 16th Amendment saw the turnover of nearly the entire Court. Of the nine
justices serving when Pollock was decided,235 only Justice White, a dissenter,236 was still
on the Court in 1913.237 And it was an elderly Justice White, writing for a unanimous
Supreme Court, who would later formally reject Pollock’s source rule.238
(5)

The 16th Amendment and the Judicial Rejection of Pollock’s
Source Rule

The 16th Amendment eliminated any remaining constitutional requirement that
taxes on income be apportioned. It provided:
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment
among the several States, and without regard to any census or
enumeration.239
The Supreme Court would say many times that the 16th Amendment did not grant
to Congress any new power of taxation.240 Congress had the power under the original
234

Id. at 415 (“As to the alleged inequality of operation between mining corporations and others, it is of
course true that the revenues derived from the working of mines result to some extent in the exhaustion of
the capital. But the same is true of the earnings of the human brain and hand when unaided by capital, yet
such earnings are commonly dealt with in legislation as income.”).
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The justices on the Court in 1898 were Justices Fuller, Harlan, Field, Gray, Brewer, Brown, Shiras,
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http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0101281.html (2006)
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See discussion infra beginning at note 247.
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U.S. CONST. art XVI (1913).
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See e.g. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206 (1920) (“As repeatedly held, this [the 16th
Amendment] did not extend the taxing power to new subjects, but merely removed the necessity which
otherwise might exist for an apportionment among the States of taxes laid on income.”); Stanton v. Baltic
Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103, 112-13 (1916) (“the provisions of the Sixteenth Amendment conferred no new
power of taxation but simply prohibited the previous complete and plenary power of income taxation
possessed by Congress from the beginning from being taken out of the category of indirect taxation to
which it inherently belonged and being placed in the category of direct taxation subject to apportionment
by a consideration of the sources from which the income was derived, that is by testing the tax not by what
it was -- a tax on income, but by a mistaken theory deduced from the origin or source of the income
taxed.”); Brushaber v. Union P. R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 11-18 (1918) (‘It is clear on the face of this text [of the
16th Amendment] that it does not purport to confer power to levy income taxes in a generic sense – an
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Constitution to impose all forms of taxes, other than taxes on exports, including any type
of property or income tax. The 16th Amendment simply eliminated the requirement from
Pollock that taxes on income from real and personal property be apportioned – a
requirement that by 1913 only applied if the income from the real or personal property
had not resulted from an activity or transaction. The 16th Amendment thus repudiated
the Supreme Court’s theory in Pollock by eliminating the one potential impediment to the
imposition of broad-based income taxes – the requirement of apportionment applicable to
taxes on income from the mere ownership of real or personal property.
The 16th Amendment did not, however, eliminate the apportionment requirement
entirely. The apportionment requirement remains for direct taxes that are not income
taxes, as the 16th Amendment applies by its terms only to “taxes on incomes.”241 Thus,
for example, under the consistent rulings of the Supreme Court, Congress would still not
be able to impose a traditional ad valorem real property tax without apportionment.242 In
addition, the constitutional amendment made no change in the geographical uniformity
requirement for duties, imposts and excises.243
Following adoption of the 16th Amendment in 1913, Congress quickly imposed a
broad based income tax.244 In Brushaber v. Union Pacific,245 a case procedurally
identical to Pollock, a stockholder sought to enjoin a corporation from paying income
taxes imposed under the Tariff Act of 1913. The Supreme Court upheld the validity of
the income tax without apportionment under the 16th Amendment, and rejected the
authority already possessed and never questioned – or to limit and distinguish between one kind of income
taxes and another, but that the whole purpose of the Amendment was to relieve all income taxes when
imposed from apportionment from a consideration of the source whence the income was derived.”).
Congress’s plenary power under the Constitution to impose all forms of taxation other than taxes
on exports was settled long before the enactment of the 16th Amendment. See e.g. Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock II), 158 U.S. 601, 618 (1895) (“The power to lay direct taxes apportioned
among the several States in proportion to their representation in the popular branch of Congress, a
representation based on population as ascertained by the census, was plenary and absolute; but to lay direct
taxes without apportionment was forbidden. The power to lay duties, imposts, and excises was subject to
the qualification that the imposition must be uniform throughout the United States.”); Hylton v. United
States, 3 U.S. 171, 176 (1796) (Patterson, J.) (“It was, however, obviously the intention of the framers of
the Constitution, that Congress should possess full power over every species of taxable property, except
exports.The term taxes, is generical, and was made use of to vest in Congress plenary authority in all cases
of taxation.”)
241
U.S. CONST. art XVI (1913) (“The Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes on incomes,
from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any
census or enumeration.”).
242
Every Court from Hylton to Pollock recognized that, at a minimum, a real property tax would have to be
apportioned. Since such a tax would be on value and not on income, the 16th Amendment should not have
changed the Constitutional mandate. I have heard some academics argue that a property tax should be
permissible without apportionment if the tax did not exceed the rate of income from property generally, or
the rate of tax earned on the property. Aside from the technical problems inherent in justifying a property
tax as an income tax (some property does not earn income, for example), the Court’s decisions in
Spreckels, Thomas and Flint put substantial weight on the form of the tax, casting significant doubt on the
ability of courts to recharacterize an ad valorem property tax as an income tax.
243
The amendment leaves open the question of whether income taxes have to be geographically uniform.
To the extent Pollock remains good law, taxes on income from property could be imposed in a non-uniform
manner because they do not constitute “duties, imposts and excises.”
244
Tariff Act of October 3, 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, § II, Ch. 16, 38 Stat. 166 (1913).
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argument that the 16th Amendment conflicted with a limited taxing power contained in
the Constitution. The Court held that the 16th Amendment eliminated the apportionment
requirement for direct income taxes – it did not create a new taxing power, and thus did
not create a conflict.246
In Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co.247 Justice White finally took his revenge against
the Pollock majority. A shareholder in a mining company claimed that the 1913 Act
effectively imposed a tax not on the mining company’s “income,” but on its property
without apportionment, because the Act did not allow adequate depletion allowances to
be deducted from its gross receipts.248 Justice White’s opinion for a unanimous Court
upheld the tax both because it was within the 16th Amendment, and, even if it had not
been within the Amendment, because it was as a valid excise on the operation of the mine
in accordance with the Court’s pre-16th Amendment decision in Stratton’s.249 Baltic
Mining shows that a court considering the constitutionality of a tax must look not only to
the 16th Amendment, but also to any other taxing powers given to Congress in Article I
of the Constitution. A purported tax on income which is outside of the 16th Amendment
is not per-say unconstitutional, since it may be within Congress’s general taxing power.
And, according to the Court in Baltic Mining, that general taxing power allows Congress
to tax as income, without apportionment, items that may not constitute “income” within
the meaning of the 16th Amendment. For example, a tax not on “income” within the
meaning of the 16th Amendment could still be upheld without apportionment if it
constituted a “duty or excise” attributable to the taxpayer’s conduct. Indeed, this was the
basis upon which the Court had repeatedly upheld the 1909 Corporate Income Tax Act.
The Court in Baltic Mining also made a direct assault on the “source” theory
utilized in Pollock, calling it a “mistaken theory:”
[T]he provisions of the Sixteenth Amendment conferred no new
power of taxation but simply prohibited the previous complete and
plenary power of income taxation possessed by Congress from the
beginning from being taken out of the category of indirect
taxation to which it inherently belonged and being placed in the
category of direct taxation subject to apportionment by a
consideration of the sources from which the income was derived,
that is by testing the tax not by what it was – a tax on income, but
by a mistaken theory deduced from the origin or source of the
income taxed.250
Pollock was not over-ruled in Baltic Mining, but only because Pollock’s “erroneous”
source theory had been mooted by the adoption of the 16th Amendment.
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Id. at 112-13; See also supra note 240.
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Id. at 114 (“[I]ndependently of the effect of the operation of the Sixteenth Amendment it was settled in
Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, that such a tax is not a tax upon property as such
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(6)

Congress’s Tax on Ms. Murphy’s Damages Award Was Not a
Direct Tax Requiring Apportionment.

The court of appeals in Murphy held that Ms. Murphy’s emotional distress
damages award was not “income” within the meaning of the 16th Amendment, and
therefore Congress lacked the power to tax the award.251 The court of appeals erred in
reaching this conclusion. As shown above, the correct constitutional question was
whether Congress had the power under any provision of the Constitution to tax Ms.
Murphy’s damages award, not whether the award could be taxed under the 16th
amendment.252
If, as the court of appeals held, Ms. Murphy’s damages award was not “income”
within the meaning of the 16th Amendment,253 then the court of appeals should have
“search[ed] the Constitution to ascertain whether or not the power is conferred.”254 In
searching the Constitution, the court of appeals should have discovered Article I of the
Constitution, which authorized Congress to tax anything other than exports, but required
direct taxes to be apportioned.255 Therefore, after holding that Ms. Murphy’s damages
award was not “income” within the meaning of the 16th Amendment, the court of appeals
should have proceeded to determine whether the tax imposed on Ms. Murphy’s damages
award was a direct tax requiring apportionment (in which case Congress’s attempt to tax
Ms. Murphy’s award without apportionment would be unconstitutional), or whether it
was an indirect duty or excise which could be lawfully imposed without apportionment.
There are two alternative reasons for treating the taxation of Ms. Murphy’s
damages award as an indirect “duty or excise” requiring no apportionment, even if the
award did not constitute “income” within the meaning of the 16th Amendment. As
discussed below, the tax on Ms. Murphy’s award was a valid duty or excise both because
Ms. Murphy engaged in a transaction when she exchanged her emotional distress
damages for cash, and because taxes on what we today call human capital were never
considered by the courts direct taxes on property requiring apportionment.
(a)

Congress Could Tax Ms. Murphy’s Exchange of Emotional
Distress Damages for Cash.

The first reason to treat the tax on Ms. Murphy’s award as a “duty or excise” that
could be taxed without apportionment is that Ms. Murphy engaged in a transaction when
she sold her emotional and reputational damages for cash.
Congress’s original Article I powers included the unfettered authority to tax
duties and excises without apportionment.256 The Court specifically recognized, both
prior to the adoption of the 16th Amendment and afterwards, that Congress had the
power to tax the gross proceeds from the sale of property. For example, before Pollock
questioned Congress’s ability to tax income from real or personal property without
251
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apportionment, the Supreme Court had upheld taxes on the gross proceeds from the
issuance of bank notes,257 and on the gross proceeds inherited at death.258 These
authorities were reaffirmed in Pollock, and distinguished on the grounds that they were
not taxes on income from property, but rather taxes on activites. Following Pollock, the
Court made it clear that Congress had the power to tax transactions, without
apportionment, because they constitute indirect duties or excises rather than direct taxes
on the mere ownership of property.259 After Pollock, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
Congress’s power to tax the gross proceeds transferred at death,260 the transfer of stock
certificates without respect to income,261 and most importantly the gross proceeds from
the sale of sugar.262 The Court thus recognized Congress’s power to tax without
apportionment the gross proceeds realized in a transaction involving property both
before and after Pollock, and without regard to the 16th Amendment. In essence, what
was left of Pollock at the time the 16th Amendment was adopted was a restriction on
imposing broad taxes on unrealized income from property – for the events that trigger
realization also, generally, constitute activities that could be taxed as duties or excises.
Under its historical Article I power, as repeatedly recognized both before and after
Pollock, Congress had the constitutional power to tax without apportionment Ms.
Murphy’s damages award because it was the result of an activity – a sale of her lost
human capital interest for cash.
There are a few Supreme Court cases that are often cited for the general
proposition that a recovery of capital cannot constitutionally be taxed. The Supreme
Court’s famous decision in Eisner v. Macomber,263 discussed in detail below,264 is
sometimes mis-cited as a decision prohibiting the taxation of capital. But Macomber
only dealt with taxing what the Court determined to be unrealized income – a pure stock
dividend that only resulted in additional pieces of paper to reflect the same ownership as
before. Ironically, Macomber, by converting realization into a constitutional imperative,
may have rendered the 16th Amendment entirely moot, because the Court had repeatedly
recognized before the 16th Amendment that realized income resulting from an activity,
such as a sale or exchange, could be taxed without apportionment as a duty or excise.265
Macomber never questioned Congress’s ability to tax the entire proceeds from a sale or
exchange transaction, without apportionment, as a “duty or excise” under Article I. The
quick retreat from Macomber concerning whether realization was constitutionally
mandated suggests there should be little concern that the Court will expand Macomber’s
reach.266
257

See Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. 533 (1869), discussed supra beginning at note 154.
Scholey v. Rew, 102 U.S. 586 (1880), discussed supra beginning at note 159.
259
See discussion supra in Part IV.A(4) beginning on page 33, and Part IV.A(5) beginning on page 39.
260
Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900), discussed supra beginning at note 200.
261
Thomas v. United States, 192 U.S. 363 (1904), discussed supra beginning at note 215.
262
Spreckels Sugar Refining Co. v. McClain, 192 U.S. 397 (1904), discussed supra beginning at note 212.
263
252 U.S. 189 (1920).
264
See infra beginning at note 354.
265
See discussion supra beginning at note 221
266
See discussion supra beginning at note 393. Note also that Congress has imposed a number of taxes on
unrealized income, most notably on imputed interest earned annually but only paid upon maturity of an
interest under the so-called original issue discount rules (see IRC § 1272), and the requirement of mark-tomarket accounting for dealers in securities and parties involved in hedging transactiosn (See IRC § 475;
1256).
258

43

The other case that is often cited for the proposition that Congress cannot tax
capital is Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co.,267 which did not consider the constitutional issue.
Even reading Doyle broadly to express a definition of income that was incorporated into
the 16th Amendment does not address the alternative theory for Congress’s constitutional
authority in Article I for taxing transactions and activities as duties and excises without
apportionment.
Finally, there is one troubling Macomber era case that lends support to the notion
that Congress lacks the power to tax capital. The case is Edwards v. Cuba Railroad
Co.,268 in which the Court held that subsidy payments made by the government of Cuba
to induce development of railroad lines in that country were not income, but rather the
recovery of capital, and therefore the payments could not be taxed under the 16th
Amendment. There was little in the way of reasoning in the case. The Court did not
consider the alternative constitutional bases for Congress to tax the transaction that
generated the subsidy payments under Article I as duties and excises, because Congress
had not sought to do so. In fact, the entire constitutional discussion in Cuba Railroad
was inappropriate because the Court failed to first determine, as a matter of statutory law,
whether Congress had in fact sought to tax the subsidy payments. Presumably, if the
subsidy payments did not, as the Court held, constitute income, then Congress had in fact
not sought to tax them in the statute. The Court could easily have avoided the
constitutional question by ruling that the statute did not reach the subsidy payments.
Despite the opinion’s obvious shortcomings, the Court’s suggestion in Cuba Railroad
that Congress lacks the constitutional power to tax capital would lend some support,
however dubious, to the notion that capital cannot constitutionally be taxed.
Although Cuba Railroad has never been directly overturned, its continuing
validity is in great doubt. The opinion was issued at a time in which income was defined
as a gain from capital, labor or both combined. By 1943, the Court was already having
some doubts about the Macomber definition of income. In Detroit Edison Company v.
Commissioner,269 the Court considered whether an electric company that received from
its customers the funds necessary to construct certain power plants could take
depreciation deductions. In explaining why the funds received by the electric company
from its customers for the construction of the plants had not been treated as income, the
Court stated: “They [the customer construction funds] have not been taxed as income,
presumably because it has been thought to be precluded by this Court's decisions in
Edwards v. Cuba R. Co. holding that under the circumstances of that case a government
subsidy to induce railroad construction was not income.”270 Because the funds were not
taxed, and thus the electric company had no basis in the power plant, the Court held that
depreciation deductions could be denied. The Court’s language in Detroit Edison
suggested some question about the continuing validity of Cuba Railroad. One would
think that the Court’s expanded definition of “income” later adopted in Glenshaw
Glass271 would have effectively overruled the Cuba Railroad as a constitutional doctrine..
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With the exception of the weakly reasoned early opinion in Cuba Railroad, the
existing authorities suggest that Congress could constitutionally tax the entire proceeds
from the sale or exchange of property without apportionment, even though there would
be no “gain” or “income” realized in the transaction.272
As is discussed below, 273 Congress created a basis tracking system to prevent the
double taxation of already-taxed (or exempted) financial capital. The basis system
carries out Congress’s policy of taxing income earned by a particular taxpayer only once
at the time of realization. Congress’s decision to tax only the gain from property cannot
be interpreted to limit Congress’s earlier power under Article I of the Constitution to tax
entire transactions without regard to the recovery of basis. Therefore, even if Ms.
Murphy’s human capital were to be treated in the same way as previously-taxed financial
capital, Congress would have the power under Article I to tax as a duty or excise, without
apportionment, the entire proceeds Ms. Murphy received when she sold her emotional
distress damages for cash. This would be so even if Ms. Murphy had basis in her human
capital equal to the amount of the award. As is discussed below, however, what we today
call human capital has not been treated by the courts in the same way as financial
capital,274 and Ms. Murphy did not have any basis in her human capital and therefore her
entire award was “income” within the meaning of the 16th Amendment.275 Congress had
the power under Article I of the Constitution to tax Ms. Murphy’s award even
interpreting the principle of human capital in a way most favorable to Ms. Murphy’s
position.
(b)

Congress Could Tax Ms. Murphy’s Human Capital.

The second reason for treating Ms. Murphy’s award as a “duty or excise” rather
than a direct tax is that taxes on human capital have never been considered direct taxes.
Prior to Pollock, the Court had suggested that only taxes on land, slaves, capitation or
poll taxes, and possibly taxes on entire estates by general list were direct,276 while taxes
on “personal property, contracts, occupations and the like”277 were regarded as indirect.
In Pollock, the Court held that taxes on real and personal property were direct, but that
taxes on “business, privileges, or employments” were not.278 Thus, throughout the long
history of taxation, the Court has never suggested that a tax on human capital, other than
272
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a head or capitation tax which is specifically mentioned in the Constitution (and is not
imposed on human capital but on human beings regardless of potential),279 is direct.
Indeed, the Court consistently recognized, even in Pollock, that Congress has the
unfettered ability to tax wages. And wages are, after all, simply receipts from the sale of
human capital.280 If taxes on human capital were treated the same way under the
Constitution as taxes on financial capital, then the Court’s distinction in Pollock between
income from real and personal property (held to be direct), and income from
employments (held to be indirect) would be erroneous, since both would constitute
income from “capital.” The Court and Congress have not treated what we today call
“human capital” in the same way as financial capital,281 and the Court has never
questioned Congress’s ability to tax without apportionment income from the sale of
human capital. Since the tax on Ms. Murphy’s damages award was not a tax on real or
personal property, but at best a tax on human capital which has never been treated as real
or personal property,282 there should have been no constitutional limitation on Congress’s
power to tax it without apportionment.
Therefore, both because Congress has the unlimited power to tax transactions
involving the sale of any form of capital without apportionment, and because human
capital has never been treated as financial capital or property for the purpose of taxation,
Congress had the power to tax Ms. Murphy’s damages award even if it did not constitute
“income” within the meaning of the 16th Amendment.
By wrongly focusing on the 16th Amendment as the sole source of Congress’s
taxing power, the court of appeals in Murphy failed to consider Congress’s original grant
of power contained in Article I of the Constitution, by which it could tax Ms. Murphy’s
award irrespective of whether it constitutes “income” within the meaning of the 16th
Amendment. Moreover, by treating human capital in the same way as financial capital
for purposes of the 16th Amendment, the court of appeals in Murphy has opened a
Pandora’s box, raising questions about the constitutional validity of taxes on such firmly
established sources as wages.283 That box can be easily closed through proper analysis,
returning tax policy to the Congress where it belongs.
B.

Congress Had the Power to Tax Ms. Murphy’s Damages Award Under the
16th Amendment.
(1)

The Court of Appeals’ Holding in Murphy.
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The court of appeals in Murphy concluded that Ms. Murphy’s award of emotional
and reputational damages was not “income” within the meaning of the 16th Amendment
because it involved a “restoration of capital.” In support of this statement, the court of
appeals relied on two 1918 Supreme Court cases, Doyle v. Mitchell Bros., Co, and S. Pac.
Co. v. Lowe, for the proposition that a “return of capital [is] not income under [the] IRC
or Sixteenth Amendment.”284
In addition, the court of appeals agreed with Ms.
Murphy’s argument that two 1918 administrative opinions, “strongly suggest that the
term ‘incomes’ as used in the Sixteenth Amendment does not extend to monies received
solely in compensation for a personal injury unrelated to lost wages or earnings.”285 The
court of appeals then concluded that both physical and non-physical awards were not
“income” within the 16th Amendment, and the attempt by Congress to tax non-physical
awards was therefore unconstitutional.286
In reaching these conclusions, the court of appeals failed to put these materials in
their proper historical context or to correctly interpret their holdings. A proper analysis
of the cited materials in the light of their historical context will show that none of these
materials was inferring a constitutional limitation on Congress’s taxing power. Rather,
the materials were attempting to apply then-recent Supreme Court interpretations of the
applicable tax acts, not the Constitution. These early Supreme Court statutory (and later
Constitutional) interpretations have long since been rejected or limited. A proper
understanding of the historical materials cited by the court of appeals in Murphy requires
careful chronological review of tax history. A careful in-context review of these
materials will show that they do not support the court of appeal’s conclusion that the
enactors of the 16th Amendment intended human capital recoveries to be beyond the
reach of Congress’s income taxing power. Moreover, under modern interpretations of
Congress’s taxing power under the 16th Amendment, Ms. Murphy’s award would
constitute “income” because she realized an accession to her financial wealth.
(2)

The Historical Meaning of “Income” Under the 16th Amendment
Before Macomber.

Each of the American taxing statutes have taxed income on an annual basis. In
order to do so, it has been necessary to determine how increases in property value
accruing over a period of time would be taxed. There are two fundamentally different
types of income tax systems for determining in what year income from property will be
taxable: (1) tax the increase in the value of property accruing on an annual basis,
regardless of whether the property has been sold or the improvement in value has been
severed from the property in some way (hereafter, the “annual accrual system”), or (2) do
not tax the annual increase, but instead tax the entire increase in value at the time of
realization – either when the gain is severed in some way from the property, such as upon
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sale, exchange or other disposition of the property, or when some other recognized event
of realization occurs (hereafter, the “realization system”).287
The annual accrual system is difficult to administer because any increase in the
value of property must be estimated, since there is no market-based event that establishes
the value. In addition, an accrual system can work financial hardships on the owners of
property who, prior to sale or other realization event, will have received no money from
the property with which to pay the tax. The main drawbacks of the realization system are
(1) the need to clearly define the realization event, (2) the ability of taxpayers to defer
paying taxes on income from the time it accrues until the realization event occurs, and (3)
the problem of bracket creep – taxing income accruing during multiple tax years in the
single year of realization.
There is nothing in the text of the 16th amendment that would eliminate the
apportionment requirement only for one type of income tax system but not the other.
Moreover, both types of income taxation systems had been utilized in the United States
prior to the adoption of the 16th Amendment. The annual accrual system appears to have
been utilized in the first federal income tax act which was adopted during the Civil War,
according to the Court in Gray v. Darlington.288 The taxpayer in Darlington bought
United States Treasury Notes before 1865, exchanged the Notes for United States
Treasury Bonds in 1865, and sold the Bonds in 1869 for a profit of $20,000 over the
original cost of the Notes. The issue was whether that entire profit, accruing over more
than four years, two of which were prior to the enactment of the taxing act, would be
taxed in the year of sale. The Court, interpreting the language of the 1867 Act requiring
the tax to be “levied, collected, and paid annually,” held that only the increase in value
attributed to the tax year was taxable under the statute.
Similarly, in Collector v. Hubbard,289 a shareholder objected to being taxed on the
corporation’s income that had not been severed or paid as dividends. The 1864 Act
required all corporate income, whether distributed or not, to be included in the
shareholder’s income subject to tax.290 Although the case was decided on procedural
grounds, the Court stated, apparently in dicta, that the undistributed corporate profits
should have been included in income.291 The Court in Hubbard made no mention of the
Constitution, ruling entirely on the basis of the statutory language.
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There is a third potential system, which would look at final results of investments rather than annual
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On the other hand, the Court in Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co.,292 recognized that the
realization system applied under the 1909 Corporate Income Tax Act. Doyle was decided
under the 1909 Act after the enactment of the 16th Amendment, but concerned years
before the Amendment. The Court in Doyle assumed without analysis that all of the
income accruing from the time of enactment of the Act – 1909 – until the date of sale was
subject to tax at once in the year of sale. The main issue of contention in Doyle,
however, was whether the increase in the value of assets accruing prior to the 1909 Act
but realized after the enactment of the 1909 Act would also be included in income in the
year of realization. The Court, noting that part of the proceeds received from the sale of
property is attributable to the recovery of original cost, and part in the receipt of gain (if
the sale is for more than cost) or incurrence of loss (if the sale is for less than cost), first
noted that only the gain from property should be included in the concept of “income”
under the 1909 Act. The Court stated that this rule – that “income” only constitutes the
gain realized from the sale of property, and not the entire proceeds of sale – “has been
recognized from the beginning [of the 1909 Corporate Tax] by the administrative officers
of the Government.”293 The Court went on to interpret the 1909 Act to impose a tax only
on income accrued after 1909. The value of property on the date of the enactment of the
1909 Act, even if in excess of cost, would be deducted from the sale proceeds in
determining the gain or income realized in the year of sale.294 Doyle was decided entirely
on the grounds of statutory construction, and did not consider the meaning of the 16th
Amendment of the Constitution (which indeed had no application to the case). There was
also no suggestion in the opinion that Congress lacked the Constitutional power to tax
income in the year of sale attributed to periods before enactment of the Act.
Doyle has been regularly cited by subsequent courts for its quotation from the
Stratton’s case, defining income as a “gain from capital or labor or from both
combined.”295 In both cases, the Court was defining income for the purpose of
determining whether the tax was an excise on business activity, as was required by the
statute in both cases. The constitutionality of the 1909 Act had, after all, been upheld by
distinguishing Pollock on the grounds that the 1909 Act had a business activity
requirement. Whether this definition of income should have been applied under the 16th
Amendment, which allowed the taxation of income without apportionment irrespective of
business activity, would be an issue of debate until the mid 1950s, when the Supreme
Court ruled that the old definition was not a touchstone for the meaning of income.296
The Court in Doyle also noted that the government did not challenge the method utilized
by the taxpayer for allocating income between the pre-1909 period and the post-1909
292
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period.297 The court of appeals’ suggestion in Murphy that Doyle had interpreted the
meaning of the 16th Amendment298 is simply incorrect.
In Hays v. Gauley Mountain Coal Co.,299 the Court again held that the language
used by Congress in the 1909 Act, unlike the language used by Congress in the 1869 Act
that had been interpreted by the Court in Darlington,300 showed an intent to tax all of the
income from property in the year of sale, rather than on an annual basis when it accrued –
at least to the extent that it accrued after enactment of the Act in 1909. The Court stated:
The expression "income received during such year," employed in
the Act of 1909, looks to the time of realization rather than to
the period of accruement, except as the taking effect of the act on
a specified date (January 1, 1909), excludes income that accrued
before that date.301
Thus was borne the formal concept of “realization,” which began as a matter of statutory
construction of the 1909 Corporate Income Tax Act.302
The broad 1913 income tax, enacted after the adoption of the 16th Amendment,
used language more similar to the Civil War Income Tax than the 1909 Corporate Tax,
covering all income “arising or accruing” during the year.303 The 1913 statute did not
specify whether an accrual system or realization system would apply.304
However, despite the vague language of the statute, the Court promptly
interpreted the language to adopt a realization system. In Towne v. Eisner,305 the Court

297

247 U.S. at 188.
Murphy, 460 F.3d at 85.
299
247 U.S. 189 (1918).
300
Id. at 191 ("Gains, profits, and income for the year ending the thirty-first day of December next
preceding" (Act of 1867) conveys a different meaning from "the entire net income . . . Received by it . . .
during such year" (Act of 1909).”).
301
Id. at 192 (emphasis added).
302
The cases were not consistent in the method for computing gain attributed to the post-1909 period. In
Doyle, the gain was based on the difference between the sale price of the processed timber and its
unprocessed value at the time the 1909 act went into effect. Doyle, 247 U.S. at 188. In Hays, Court upheld
that government’s assessment of a pro-rata portion of the gain allocated pro rata on the basis of time. The
taxpayer in Hays had purchased stock for $800,000 in 1902, and sold the stock for $1,010,000 in 1911,
realizing a total profit of $210,000. The taxpayer had owned the stock for a total of 3,233 days, and the
sale occurred 1019 days after the enactment of the 1909 Act. Therefore, the government computed the tax
proportionally on the basis of time: (1,019/3,233) X $210,000 = $66,189.30. Hays, 247 U.S. at 190. In S.
Pac. Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330, 335 (1918), the court used the Doyle approach, by accepting the stipulated
value for stock at the beginning of 1909 as the basis for determining gain.
303
Compare supra note 300 with Act of October 3, 1913, c. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 116 (“There shall be levied,
assessed, collected and paid annually upon the entire net income arising or accruing from all sources in the
preceding calendar year . . . a tax of 1 per centum per annum upon such income.”).
304
For example, the statute said that the additional tax “shall embrace the share to which he [the taxpayer]
would be entitled of the gains and profits, if divided or distributed, whether divided or distributed or not, of
all corporations . . . or associations however created or organized, formed or fraudulently availed of for the
purpose of preventing the imposition of such tax through the medium of permitting such gains or profits to
accumulate instead of being divided or distributed.” Id. It also covered income from “sales or ownership
or use of or interest in real or personal property, also from interest, rent, dividends, securities”. Id. at 167.
305
245 U.S. 418 (1918).
298

50

held that a stock dividend306 did not create a realization event for the shareholder under
the 1913 Act.
Justice Holmes, writing for a unanimous court, made two important
statements in the Towne opinion. First, the Court stated that the 1913 Act’s definition of
“income” may not be the same as the definition of “income” in the 16th Amendment.307
The idea that “income” had the same meaning in the statute and the 16th Amendment
first occurred in the 1920 decision in Eisner v. Macomber.308 The court of appeals in
Murphy cited Macomber for the a synonymous reading of “income,” and suggested that
the Macomber analysis should be respected because it has been “acquiesced in for a long
term of years.”309 However, as discussed below,310 Macomber did not say that the two
terms were synonymous, but only that Congress intended to exert its full taxing power.
Second, the Court in Towne held that the 1913 Act did not reach the taxpayer’s
stock dividend, because neither the shareholder nor the corporation received any separate
gain from the distribution of the additional shares.311 The Court did not base its decision
on an interpretation of the 16th Amendment, but rather relied on an interpretation of the
306

A pure stock dividend is a pro-rata distribution of additional stock to all shareholders. For accounting
purposes, a corporation declaring a stock dividend must transfer amounts showing as earnings on its
balance sheet to paid-in-capital. On the corporation’s books, the transaction looks the same as a cash
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1913 Act. Indeed, the author of the opinion in Towne, Justice Holmes, would later
dissent in Macomber from the effort to constitutionalize the ruling.312
In 1918, the Court issued on the same day four tax opinions that would greatly
confuse tax jurisprudence. In the main case, Lynch v. Hornby,313 the Court held that the
1913 Act could reach income accrued by a corporation before the Act but paid as
dividends after the Act. “We repeat that under the 1913 Act dividends declared and paid
in the ordinary course by a corporation to its stockholders after March 1, 1913, whether
from current earnings or from a surplus accumulated prior to that date, were taxable as
income to the stockholder.”314 The decision was of limited importance, because by the
time the Court issued the opinion Congress had already exempted income earned before
1913 from taxation in the 1916 and 1917 Acts.315 Nevertheless, the decision constituted a
broad view of Congress’s new taxing power.
But the broad reading of the 1913 Act in Hornby was confusingly restricted in the
second companion case, Lynch v. Turrish,316 where a shareholder received in 1914 a
liquidating distribution in cash from a corporation. The liquidating distribution
represented twice the original cost of the shareholder’s stock, and was the result of the
gradual appreciation in the value of the corporation’s timberland. The shareholder
argued that the increase in the value of assets over many years should not be taxable in
entirety in the year of sale, citing Gray v. Darlington.317 The Court agreed with the
taxpayer, and stated broadly that the profit accrued in prior years from the increase in the
market value of assets was not “income” but rather “capital” under the Act.318 The Court
did not mention Hornby, apparently because it dealt with a dividend rather than a
liquidating distribution. The distinction between Hornby and Turrish hinged on the
language of the taxing statute, not upon any constitutional limitation on the power of
Congress to impose taxes. In Hornby, Congress specifically provided in the taxing
statute that dividends, regardless of source, would be treated as income, while in Turrish
no such specific language was included with respect to gains from increases in the value
of property upon liquidation. Nevertheless, the loose language in Turrish would later
lead to constitutional challenges to Congress’s ability to tax capital gains.319
312
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In the third companion case, Southern Pacific Company v. Lowe,320 the Court
made a fine distinction of Hornby. Hornby permitted the taxation of dividends paid after
enactment of the 1913 Act from income earned both before and after the Act, but Hornby
would not apply to dividends paid after enactment of the 1913 Act from income that had
been earned entirely before the Act – at least where a single shareholder had total control
of the corporation.321 The Court ignored the corporate form set up by the taxpayer to
treat the income, distributed to the taxpayer in the form of dividends after the 1913 Act,
as if earned by the taxpayer before the 1913 Act was adopted.
Interestingly, the court of appeals in Murphy cited Lowe (along with Doyle)322 as
holding that a “return of capital is not income under [the] IRC or Sixteenth
Amendment.”323 Both citations are erroneous. The Court in Lowe did not discuss
whether a return of capital was income under the 16th Amendment. The only mention in
the opinion of the 16th Amendment concerned the date of its enactment. One could
argue that Lowe implied that Congress might not be able to tax income earned by an
owner of property before the effective date of the statute, although a careful reading of
the opinion makes no such suggestion (and the theory would seem inconsistent with the
Court’s contemporaneous holding in Hornby).324
In the final companion case, Peabody v. Eisner,325 the Court made clear that
Towne v. Eisner was limited to stock dividends of the issuing corporation, and would not
apply to dividends made in the form of cash or corporate assets such as stock in other
companies. In Peabody, the Court held that cash or property dividends are always
taxable as income.
It was after this series of confusing 1918 judicial opinions, especially the opinion
in Turrish which caused some to believe that capital gains might not be “income” at all
under the Act, that the 1918 Attorney General opinion and Treasury Department
Decision, which were relied on by the court of appeals in Murphy, were issued. At the
time, the concept of realization and the method for determining cost basis were in their
early development. The Court had repeated a definition of income – “gain derived from
capital, from labor, or from both combined”326 – that had been used in the 1909 Acts to
320
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distinguish between profits from corporate activity that could be taxed as an excise
without apportionment, and mere unrealized increases in the value of property that, under
Pollock, could not be taxed without apportionment.327
Contrary to the suggestion made by the court of appeals in Murphy, none of the
Supreme Court’s opinions before 1920 had suggested that Congress lacked the power to
tax capital under the 16th Amendment. Rather, all of the Court’s opinions had focused
on the language and intent of the taxing statutes. In addition, the Court in Towne v.
Eisner had flatly rejected the contention that the word “income” under the 1913 Act and
under the 16th Amendment were necessarily synonymous. While constitutional
questions had been raised by the parties, the Court had carefully sidestepped the
constitutional issues.
The court of appeals in Murphy relied heavily on a 1918 Attorney General
Opinion328 and a 1918 Treasury Decision329 to support its theory that the enactors of the
16th Amendment did not intend for damage awards in compensation for losses of human
capital to be included within the definition of income.330 However, neither of these
administrative materials support the court of appeals’ theory, as neither purported to
determine the meaning of income under the 16th Amendment.
The Attorney General’s 1918 opinion considered whether the proceeds of an
accident insurance policy would be taxable under the 1916 and 1917 Acts. The General
noted that the Court in Stratton and Doyle had defined income under the 1909 Act as
“gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined,” and that the court of
appeals’ decision in Doyle,331 which had been affirmed by the Supreme Court,332 had
suggested in dicta that insurance proceeds received in compensation for damages to
property should not constitute income under the 1909 Act because the insured loss could
not be deducted under the Act.333 The General then concluded that:
Assuming that this dictum [from Doyle regarding property damage
insurance proceeds] is a correct construction of the act . . . it
follows that if the proceeds of such accident insurance are held to
be "income", they are in a category different from the proceeds of
any other kind of insurance. In my opinion the act does not make
such a distinction, because the proceeds of an accident insurance
327
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policy are not "gains or profits and income" as these terms are
defined by the Supreme Court.334
The General thus explicitly based his opinion on the judicial interpretations of the
applicable statutes, and not on the enactors’ understanding of the meaning of “income”
under the 16th Amendment.335 Contrary to the court of appeals’ suggestion in Murphy,
the General’s 1918 opinion, which was issued five years after the 16th Amendment was
adopted, was based on the General’s statutory interpretations in light of the Court’s recent
statutory interpretations. The General did not purport to interpret or give an opinion
concerning the scope of the 16th Amendment.
In the course of rendering his opinion, the General speculated about why, as a
matter of policy, accident insurance proceeds might be excludible, suggesting the
recovery was on account of capital:
Without affirming that the human body is in a technical sense the
“capital” invested in an accident policy, in a broad, natural sense
the proceeds of the policy do but substitute, so far as they go,
capital which is the source of future periodical income. They
merely take the place of capital in human ability which was
destroyed by the accident. They are therefore “capital” as
distinguished from “income” receipts.336
It is this statement – a statement which in modern terms would suggest that the recovery
should be taxable since the payment is a substitute for “future periodical income” which
would have been taxed337 – that is cited in part and out of context by the court of appeals
in Murphy for the proposition that compensatory damages were not intended to be
income within the 16th Amendment. But this statement had nothing to do with the 16th
Amendment – it was a theory, however flawed,338 explaining why the General believed
that Congress had intended in the statute to exclude accident insurance proceeds from
income.
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Similarly, the 1918 Treasury Decision cited by the court of appeals in Murphy339
simply instructed internal revenue collectors to follow the Attorney General’s
interpretation of the statutory enactments.340 Once again, there was no discussion in the
Decision of the 16th Amendment. Curiously, the Decision only applied by its terms to an
“accident” recovery, and therefore may not have even covered an emotional and
reputational injury recovery like that at issue in Murphy. Therefore, a correct in-context
review of the 1918 administrative materials in their proper historical context, and the
wording used in them, belies the court of appeals’ argument in Murphy that these
materials “strongly suggest that the term ‘incomes’ as used in the Sixteenth
Amendment does not extend to money received solely in compensation for a personal
injury and unrelated to lost wages or earnings.”341
It is also important to recognize that these administrative materials, issued five
years after the enactment of the 16th Amendment, were rendered under an early Supreme
Court definition of income that would later be rejected by the Supreme Court.342 The
interpretations are simply not evidence of the clear intent of federal and state legislators
who voted for the 16th Amendment to exempt emotional distress damages from taxation
as income. The quotations used by the court of appeals in Murphy were taken out of
context, possibly to avoid quoting the language contained in the rulings showing their
statutory, and not constitutional, genesis.
Following these 1918 opinions, Congress decided in the Revenue Act of 1918343
to exempt personal injury recoveries from income.344 The court of appeals in Murphy
conceded that the scant legislative history from the 1918 Act was ambiguous as to the
reason Congress enacted a specific exclusion.345 The relevant legislative history consists
only of a short statement from a House committee report suggesting that “under present
law it is doubtful whether amounts received through accident or health insurance, or
under workmen’s compensation acts, as compensation for personal injury or sickness,
and damages received on account of such injuries or sickness, are required to be included
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Murphy, 460 F.3d at 90 (“We concur in Murphy’s view, however, that the Attorney General’s 1918
opinion and the Treasury Department’s ruling of the same year strongly suggest that the term “incomes” as
used in the Sixteenth Amendment does not extend to monies received solely in compensation for a personal
injury and unrelated to lost wages or earnings.”).
340
T.D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457 (1918) (“To collectors of internal revenue and others concerned:
The Attorney General has advised, upon the basis of recent decisions of the Supreme Court (Doyle . . .
Hornby . . . Turrish . . . and . . . Lowe . . . and it is accordingly held that the proceeds of an accident
insurance policy . . . are not income taxable under the provisions of . . . act of September 8, 1916 . . . act of
October 3, 1917. It is held upon similar principles that an amount received by an individual as a result of a
suit or compromise for personal injuries sustained by him through accident is not income taxable under the
provisions of said titles.”).
341
Murphy, 460 F.3d at 90 (emphasis added). According to Murphy, the report merely said: “it is doubtful
whether . . . compensation for personal injury or sickness . . . [is] required to be included in gross income. “
Murphy, 460 F.3d at 86, quoting H.R. REP. NO. 65-767, at 9-10 (1918).
342
See discussion of Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426 (1955), infra note 402.
343
Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, 40 Stat 1057 (1919).
344
Id. at 1065, § 213(b) (Gross income does not include the following items which shall be exempt from
taxation under this title . . . (“[t]he amount of any damages received whether by suit or agreement on
account of such [personal] injuries or sickness.”).
345
Murphy, 460 F.3d. at 90 (“We agree with the Government that the House Report on the 1918 Act is
ambiguous and therefore unhelpful on the question before us.”).
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in income.”346 At best, one can surmise that Congress based its decision to exclude
personal injury awards, at least in part, on the Attorney General’s opinion about the
current state of the law, which was itself based on statutory interpretations and not on the
limits of Congressional power under the 16th Amendment.347 While Congress might
well have sought to avoid a constitutional challenge by enacting an exemption, it might
also have thought that the exemption was justified as a matter of policy.
The Court more recently considered these administrative materials in O’Gilvie v.
United States,348 a case that asked whether Congress intended punitive damages
recovered in a personal injury action to be excluded under the 1988 version of IRC
section 104(a)(2), which had its genesis in the 1918 Act. The Court concluded, in part on
the basis of these 1918 administrative materials, that Congress only intended to exclude
compensatory damages and not punitive damages. In his dissent in O’Gilvie, Justice
Scalia criticized any attempt to explain Congress’s ultimate adoption of the exclusion for
personal injury awards on the 1918 Attorney General’s dubious and speculative “human
capital” analysis.349
The court of appeals in Murphy takes this speculation one step further, by
inferring a constitutional limitation from language that was, at best, explaining the
Attorney General’s rationale for his interpretation of the taxing statute. The court of
appeals in Murphy cited no credible authority for the proposition that the enactors of the
16th Amendment understood that “income” did not include emotional distress recoveries.
The court of appeals’ most glaring mistake was its failure to point out that the first
treasury rulings after the adoption of the 16th Amendment treated all personal injury
damages as includible in income, and taxable.350 After all, if, as the court of appeals in

346

Murphy, 460 F.3d. at 86, quoting H.R. REP. NO. 65-767, at 9-10 (1918). See also Laura Sager and
Stephen Cohen, Discrimination Against Damages For Unlawful Discrimination: The Supreme Court,
Congress, And The Income Tax, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 447, 453 n. 44 (Summer, 1998) (hereafter, Sager &
Cohen); Douglas K. Chapman, No Pain – No Gain? Should Personal Injury Damages Keep Their Tax
Exempt Status?, 9 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. J. 407, 414 (1986-87).
347
The Court of Appeals in Murphy, 460 F.3d. at 86, quoted the following statement from Dotson v. United
States, 87 F.3d 682 (5th Cir. 1996): “Congress first enacted the personal injury compensation exclusion in
1918 at a time when such payments were considered the return of human capital, and thus not
constitutionally taxable “income” under the 16th Amendment. See H.R. REP. NO. 767, 65th Cong., 2nd
Sess. 9-10 (1918).” There is nothing in the report that supports the statement from Dotson. The Court of
Appeals in Dotson also cited in a footnote an article by Robert Ellwood, Supreme Court’s Ruling on
Taxation of Discrimination Damages Provides Little Resolution, 83 J. TAX’N 148, n. 3 (1995), suggesting
that the human capital argument is seriously flawed. Dotson, at 685 n. 1.
348
519 U.S. 79 (1996).
349
Id. at 97-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The statute must exclude punitive damages because the Committee
Report must have had in mind a 1918 Treasury Decision, whose text no more supports exclusion of
punitive damages than does the text of the statute itself, but which must have meant to exclude punitive
damages since it was based on the "return-of-capital" theory, though, inconsistently with that theory, it did
not exclude the much more common category of compensation for lost income. Congress supposedly knew
all of this, and a reasonably diligent lawyer could figure it out by mistrusting the inclusive language of the
statute, consulting the Committee Report, surmising that the Treasury Decision of 1918 underlay that
Report, mistrusting the inclusive language of the Treasury Decision, and discerning that Treasury could
have overlooked lost-income compensatories, but could not have overlooked punitives. I think not.”).
350
See T.D. 2135, 17 Treas. Dec. 39, 42 (1915) (accident insurance policy proceeds and “pain and
suffering” recoveries are income); T.D. 2570, 19 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 321, 323 (1918)(workers
compensation payments are income); T.D. 2690, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 130 (1918) (“amount received as
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Murphy seems to argue,351 early administrative rulings establish the understanding of the
enactors of the 16th Amendment, then the administrative rulings issued closer to
enactment would be a better guide to the enactor’s understandings than later rulings made
after the Supreme Court had muddied the waters.
Moreover, following the 1918 Amendments, the Treasury Department interpreted
the personal injury exclusion to apply only to physical injuries.352 It was only after the
Supreme Court’s decision in Macomber, discussed below, that the administrators
changed their opinion and held that the exclusion applied to non-physical injuries as
well.353 On its face, the court of appeals’ reliance on administrative statutory
interpretations made between 1917 to 1922 to establish the understanding in 1913 of the
enactors of the 16th Amendment is dubious. But when viewed in their proper historical
context – as changes in position brought about by early Supreme Court rulings and
Congressional amendments – the court of appeals’ argument becomes absurd. In sum,
the court of appeals in Murphy cited no proper authority to support its assertion that the
enactors of the 16th Amendment intended compensatory human capital recoveries to be
outside the reach of Congress’s income taxing power.
(3)

Constitutionalizing Realization: The Troubled History of Eisner v.
Macomber and the Meaning of Income.

The Supreme Court’s first interpretation of the word “income” in the 16th
Amendment occurred in 1920, with its famous decision in Eisner v. Macomber.354
Harking back to the Pollock cases,355 Macomber was a 5-4 split decision in which the
Court ruled unconstitutional Congress’s attempt to tax a pure stock dividend. The issue
before the Court in Macomber was very similar to the issue that was decided by the Court
four years earlier in Towne356 – whether a dividend of stock in the issuing corporation
was income. However, there was one big difference between the two cases. Towne
concerned inclusion of a stock dividend under the 1913 Act, which said nothing specific
about stock dividends. Macomber, on the other hand, concerned the inclusion of stock
dividends under the 1916 Act, which specifically provided that a “stock dividend shall be
considered income, to the amount of its cash value.”357 Therefore, the justices in
Macomber could not avoid the constitutional issue by interpreting the meaning of the
statute to exclude stock dividends from income, as they had in Towne.
The Court in Macomber made the decision in Towne constitutional, by concluding
that Ms. Macomber’s stock dividend did not constitute “income” within the meaning of
the 16th Amendment. Therefore under the Pollock Court’s definition of direct taxes,
which included taxes on personal property, Congress could not tax property – in that case
the result of a suit or compromise for personal injury, being similar to the proceeds of accident insurance, is
to be accounted for as income.”).
351
Murphy, 460 F.3d. at 90.
352
See Sol. Mem. 1384, 1920-2 C.B. 71 (1920) (denying exclusion for recovery of damages for alienation
of affection stating “the term ‘personal injuries,’ as used therein means physical injuries only.”).
353
Sol. Op. 132, 1-1 C.B. 92 (1922).
354
252 U.S. 189 (1920).
355
See discussion supra beginning at note 170.
356
See discussion supra at note 305.
357
Revenue Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 757, quoted in Macomber, 252 U.S. at 205.
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Ms. Macomber’s stock from which there had been no realized income – without
apportionment. Justice White, the Pollock dissenter who as Chief Justice wrote the
majority opinions in Brushaber and Baltic Mining, was now part of the majority holding
the unapportioned tax on a corporate stock dividend to be unconstitutional.358
Macomber has no direct application to the Murphy case, because, unlike Ms.
Macomber, Ms. Murphy did engage in a transaction resulting in realization when she
exchanged her emotional distress damages for cash. However, the Court made a number
of important statements in Macomber that could be relevant to the Murphy case.
First, the Court suggested that Congress intended in the 1913 Act to “exert its
power to the extent permitted by the [16th] Amendment.”359 This dicta could be
interpreted as a reversal of the Court’s prior dicta in Towne, in which the Court concluded
that the word “incomes” in the 16th Amendment might not be co-extensive with
“income” in the 1913 Act. In addition, shortly after Macomber, the Court in Bowers v.
Kerbaugh-Empire,360 a case that has been the subject of significant academic criticism,361
358

Professor Bruce Ackerman has argued that Justice White’s views had changed from the time of his
original dissent in Pollock to the time of his majority decisions in Brushaber and Stanton. See Ackerman,
supra note 116, at 41. Professor Ackerman argues that Justice White originally sought in his Pollock
dissent to continue the Court’s historic treatment of direct taxes as applying only to land and capitation. Id.
However, by the time to his majority decisions in Brushaber and Stanton, Justice White compromised with
the majority to interpret the 16th Amendment only to over-rule Pollock’s source rule, and to accept
Pollock’s theory that a non-income tax on personal property was direct. Id. Professor Ackerman argues
that Justice White’s later view was incorrect, because the language of the 16th Amendment had been
clarified during the initial Congressional debates on the Amendment for the purpose of rejecting Pollock
entirely and reinstating the previous limitation of direct taxes to income and capitation. Id. However,
Professor Ackerman’s theory is debatable. President Taft had proposed a constitutional amendment as a
compromise to enacting a new income tax law to force the Court to re-evaluate Pollock. Id. at 35. The
Conservatives initially proposed language that would, arguably, have had no effect, since the existing
Constitution permitted direct income taxes with apportionment: “The Congress shall have power to lay and
collect taxes on incomes and inheritances.” See Ackerman, supra note 116 at 36, quoting S.J. Res. 25, 61st
Cong., 44 CONG. REC. 1568 (1909). After the liberals pointed out the need to address the apportionment
requirement, the conservatives proposed “The Congress shall have power to lay and collect direct taxes on
incomes without apportionment among the several States according to population.” Ackerman, supra note
116 at 36, quoting 44 CONG. REC. 3377 (1909). This proposal would have implicitly adopted the Pollock
definition of direct taxes (which included personal property), rather than the earlier Court view that direct
taxes were limited to real estate and capitation taxes. When the liberals suggested instead eliminating the
apportionment entirely, for all taxes, the conservatives responded that they were only agreeing to eliminate
the apportionment requirement for income taxes. See Ackerman, supra note 116 at 37. A compromise
proposed by the Senate Committee on Finance contained the language ultimately adopted. Ackerman,
supra note 116 at 38, citing S.J. Res. 40, 61st Cong., 44 CONG. REC. 3900 (1909). Professor Ackerman
argues that this compromise shows an intent to return to the pre-Pollock definition of direct taxes – real
property and capitation. Ackerman, supra note 116 at 38. However, the language of the final amendment
simply does not address whether non-income taxes on personal property remain subject to the
apportionment requirement. It is true, as Professor Ackerman points out, that the language in the initial
proposal, which would have validated the Pollock definition, was deleted. But the alternative that was
adopted leaves the personal property question open rather than putting it to rest. Contrary to Professor
Ackerman’s argument, the final language appears to have been a compromise – it neither adopted the
Pollock view that taxes on personal property were “direct” nor rejected it.
359
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 203.
360
271 U.S. 170 (1926).
361
See e.g. Deborah H. Schenk, The Story of Kirby Lumber: The Many Faces of Discharge of Indebtedness
Income, at 106, REPRINTED IN Tax Stories, supra note 371 (“The whole transaction theory [of KerbaughEmpire] is not only theoretically wrong, it is completely impractical.”). The Court ruled that a taxpayer’s
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went further in holding that “‘Income’ has been taken to mean the same thing as used in
the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909, in the Sixteenth Amendment and in the various
revenue acts subsequently passed.”362
Second, the Court adopted the definition of income used in the 1909 Corporate
Tax cases: “‘Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or
from both combined,’ provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or
conversion of capital assets, to which it applied in the Doyle case.”363
Third, the Court promoted realization from a matter of statutory convenience to a
constitutional mandate by focusing on the word “derived” in the 16th Amendment.
According to the Court, “derived” means that the income must be severed from the
property in some way.364 This notion of severance gave rise to the early concept of
realization.
In reaching its conclusion that realization was a constitutional mandate, the Court
specifically rejected the government’s argument that it could constitutionally tax a
shareholder on the income earned by a corporation each year, as it does a partner in a
partnership, even if none of that income had been distributed.365 The Court, using little in
the way of analysis or logic, held that the accrual system that had been allowed by the
Court in Collector v. Hubbard366 had been overruled by Pollock, and had not been
reinstated by the 16th Amendment.367
Four judges dissented from Macomber, in two written dissenting opinions.
Justice Holmes, who had written the Court’s earlier decision in Towne, wrote a terse
dissent arguing that the purpose of the 16th Amendment “was to get rid of nice questions
as to what might be a direct tax, and I cannot but doubt that most people not lawyers
would suppose when they voted for it they put a question like the present to rest. I am of
the opinion that the Amendment justifies the tax.”368 Justice Brandeis wrote a lengthy
Socratic dissent on the merits, arguing both that the 16th Amendment gave Congress the
power to tax a shareholder on all corporate earnings, and that the declaration of a stock
gain in U.S. dollars from paying back borrowed German marks at a depreciated value was not taxable
because the taxpayer’s use of the borrowed funds had resulted in an overall loss. While the Court has never
explicitly over-ruled the case on its facts, the theory of the case – focusing on overall results rather than
specific transactions within a taxable year - was rejected by the Court in Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks
Company, 282 U.S. 359 (1931).
362
Id. at 174.
363
Id. at 193.
364
Id. (“Here we have the essential matter: not a gain accruing to capital, not a growth or increment of
value in the investment; but a gain, a profit, something of exchangeable value proceeding from the
property, severed from the capital however invested or employed, and coming in, being ”derived,” this is
received or drawn by the recipient (the taxpayer) for his separate use, benefit and disposal; - that is income
derived from property. Nothing else answers the description.”) (emphasis in original).
365
See Id. at 218 (“But this would be a taxation of property because of its ownership, and hence would
require apportionment under the provisions of the Constitution, is settled beyond peradventure by previous
decisions of this Court.”).
366
Id. at 289.
367
Id. at 219 (“The Government nevertheless insists that the Sixteenth Amendment removed this obstacle,
so that now the Hubbard Case is authority for the power to Congress to levy a tax on the stockholder’s
share of the accumulated profits of the corporation even before division by the declaration of a dividend of
any kind. Manifestly, this argument must be rejected, since the Amendment applies to income only, and
what is called the stockholder’s share in the accumulated profits of the company is capital, not income.”).
368
Id. at 220 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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dividend – which is recognized by the corporation as a distribution of earnings and profits
with a consequent mandatory reinvestment in new stock of the corporation – is a proper
occasion for recognition of income under a realization system, and had been accepted as
such by a number of states.369
Legal historians view Macomber as a decision coming at the tail-end of what has
become known as the “Lochner Era”370 – a period in which the Court’s understanding of
judicial review included a power, known as substantive due process, to invalidate what it
believed to be improvident social legislation that posed a threat to commercial
interests.371 Shortly after Macomber, the Court in Evans v. Gore372 held that the undiminishable salaries provision of Article III of the Constitution prevented the income tax
from reaching the salary of federal judges. In Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.,373 also
known as the Child Labor Tax Case, the Court held that Congress could not use its taxing
power for the purpose of regulating an activity that it could not regulate directly under its
enumerated Constitutional powers.374 These decisions were either directly or implicitly
repudiated following the flood of new deal social legislation driven by the political winds
of the great depression. In O’Malley v. Woodrough,375the Court limited Evans v. Gore to
judges appointed prior to enactment of a tax on their income, and in United States v.
Hatter376 finally overruled it. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Company was never explicitly
overruled, but its underlying rationale was rejected when the Court recognized that
Congress held a greatly-expanded power of direct regulation under the commerce
clause.377
369

Id. at 226 – 38 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
So-named for Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
371
See e.g. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Story of Macomber: The Continuing Legacy of Realization, at 73,
in TAX STORIES, AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT TEN LEADING FEDERAL INCOME TAX CASES (Foundation Press
2003) (“Macomber is best understood as part of the struggle during the Lochner era to define the nature and
scope of government.”); Ackerman, supra note 116, at 43 (“To be sure, the year was 1920, and perhaps
Justice Pitney thought that the "function" of the clause went without saying in an era dominated by the
laissez-faire presuppositions of Lochner v. New York.”).
372
253 U.S. 245 (1920).
373
259 U.S. 20, 37-38 (1922).
374
The Court in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), had held that Congress could not prohibit the
use of child labor under its power to regulate interstate Commerce. In response, in 1919, Congress
imposed a special tax in the amount of 10% of net profits on anyone using defined child labor. Title XII of
the Revenue Act of February 24, 1919, c. 18, 40 Stat. 1138 (1919). The Court in Bailey held the 1919 tax
unconstitutional as an improper disguised attempt to regulate intrastate commerce.
375
307 U.S. 277 (1939).
376
532 U.S. 557 (2001) (“There is no good reason why a judge should not share the tax burdens borne by
all citizens. Although Congress cannot directly reduce judicial salaries even as part of an equitable effort to
reduce all Government salaries, a tax law, unlike a law mandating a salary reduction, affects compensation
indirectly, not directly.).
377
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), the decision preventing Congress from directly regulating
child labor, was over-ruled in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). Thus, the theory underlying the
Court’s decision in Bailey – that Congress could not regulate child labor by directed taxation since it could
not regulate child labor directly – was entirely undercut. In Rockefeller v. United States, 572 F. Supp. 9, 13
(E.D. Ark. 1982), the district court suggested that the general theory of Bailey – that Congress could not
regulate with a tax that which it could not regulate directly – was effectively overruled by the Court’s later
decisions, such as United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44-45 (1950), in which the Court stated: “It is
beyond serious question that a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or
definitely deters the activity taxed. The principle applies even though the revenue obtained is obviously
370
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However, Macomber has never been overruled. Professor Ackerman expressed
some surprise that the split decision in Macomber was met with “a long period of judicial
silence extending from the 1920s through today” rather than, as one would expect of a
such a famous divided decision “judicial debate and reappraisal.”378 The long formal
silence can be explained by the Court’s quick narrow interpretation of the holding, and
subsequent retreat from the definitions used by the Court in Macomber.
The narrow interpretation began the following year in Merchants’ Loan & Trust
Co. v. Smietanka.379 Emboldened by Macomber, some loose dicta in Turrish,380 and a
misunderstanding of the difference between the accrual income tax system utilized during
the Civil War as interpreted in Gray v. Darlington and the realization system utilized by
the 20th Century taxing statutes,381 taxpayers challenged the ability of the government to
tax isolated realized gains from the sale of capital assets. This was nothing short of an
attempt to eviscerate the 16th Amendment by limiting Congress’s power to tax income to
essentially that which had already been recognized under the 1909 Corporate Income Tax
Act – taxes on business activities but not on isolated property activities. The challengers
were emboldened when, shortly after Macomber, a district court in Connecticut held that
Congress could not constitutionally tax the increase in value of property (bonds, in that
case) upon sale because the increase was not “income” within the meaning of the 16th
Amendment.382 A note in the Harvard Law Review criticized the district court’s ruling
for turning a statutory interpretation issue into a constitutional one, and criticized Eisner
v. Macomber for ignoring the popular mandate by restricting the power of Congress to
legislate.383 Nevertheless, a concerned Congress enacted special non-recognition rules to
defer the taxation of gains realized on like kind exchanges.384 The concern about capital
gains was short-lived, however. Only one year after Macomber, the Court in Smietanka
firmly rejected the notion that realized gains on capital assets could not be taxed.385
Smietanka was quickly followed by United States v. Phellis,386 a case involving
the reorganization of the Du Pont company. Before the reorganization, the taxpayer in
Phellis held stock in a New Jersey Du Pont Corporation. The New Jersey Du Pont
reorganized by transferring its business assets to a new Delaware Du Pont corporation in
return for the Delaware corporation’s stock. The New Jersey Du Pont then distributed
some of its stock in the Delaware Du Pont to the taxpayer. The New Jersey Du Pont
neglible, or the revenue purpose of tax may be secondary. Nor does a tax statute necessarily fall because it
touches on activities which Congress may not otherwise regulate.”
378
Ackerman, supra note 116, at 46.
379
255 U.S. 509 (1921).
380
Lynch v. Turrish, 247 U.S. at 230 (interpreting Gray v. Darlington as holding “that such advance in
value is not income at all, but merely increase of capital and not subject to a tax as income.").
381
See discussion supra beginning at note 292.
382
Brewster v. Walsh, 268 Fed. 207 (Conn 1920), rev’d in part 255 U.S. 536 (1921).
383
Note, 34 HARV. L. REV. 536 (1921).
384
Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227 (1921).
385
Smietanka, 255 U.S. at 519-20 (“Since the fund here taxed was the amount realized from the sale of the
stock in 1917, less the capital investment as determined by the trustee as of March 1, 1913, it is palpable
that it was a ‘gain or profit’ ‘produced by’ or ‘derived from’ that investment, and that it ‘proceeded,’ and
was ‘severed’ or rendered severable, from it, by the sale for cash, and thereby became that ‘realized gain’
which has been repeatedly declared to be taxable income within the meaning of the constitutional
amendment and the acts of Congress.”).
386
257 U.S. 156 (1921).
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stayed in business as a holding company. After the reorganization, the combined
Delaware and New Jersey Du Pont’s had the same assets, and were owned and run by the
same people, as was the New Jersey corporation before the reorganization. The trial
court even noted that the market value of the taxpayer’s investment before and after the
reorganization had not changed. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, noting that
equivalency in market value is irrelevant, held that the stock dividend was taxable. The
proper question was whether the essential nature of the taxpayer’s investment had
changed in any material respect. The Court distinguished Macomber, holding that Du
Pont’s dividend of stock in the new corporation was taxable because the fundamental
nature of the taxpayer’s investment had been changed in several ways: the new Delaware
corporation was incorporated in a different state with different governance rules, was
authorized to issue a much larger amount of capital stock than the old corporation, and
was legally separate from the old corporation which continued in existence.387 Phellis,
and other similar cases that followed,388 thus limited Macomber to a very clean stock
dividend.
Furthermore, each of the principles announced in Macomber have gone through
substantial revision or have been outright rejected by later courts. The idea that the word
“income” had in the 16th Amendment the same meaning as it was interpreted to have in
the first taxing acts has been greatly limited. Eleven years after Macomber, the Court in
Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Company389 recognized that there are many possible systems
of income taxation, and that it was Congress in enacting the taxing statutes, and not the
16th Amendment, that decided which of the permissible systems to adopt.390 While the
courts have continued to say that Congress intended to exercise its full taxing power in
IRC section 61,391 the statement is properly tempered by the practical realities of the
realization system chosen by Congress, the specific statutory exclusions enacted by
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Id. at 172-73 (“In the light of all this we cannot regard the new company as virtually identical with the
old, but must treat it as a substantial corporate body with its own separate identity, and its stockholders as
having property rights and interests materially different from those incident to ownership of stock in the old
company.”).
388
Rockefeller v. United States, 257 U.S. 176 (1921); Cullinan v. Walker, 262 U.S. 134 (1923); Weiss v.
Stearn, 265 U.S. 242 (1924); Marr v. United States, 268 U.S. 536 (1925); Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S.
441 (1936).
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282 U.S. 359 (1931).
390
Id. at 365 (“The computation of income annually as the net result of all transactions within the year was
a familiar practice, and taxes upon income so arrived at were not unknown, before the Sixteenth
Amendment. It is not to be supposed that the amendment did not contemplate that Congress might make
income so ascertained the basis of a scheme of taxation such as had been in actual operation within the
United States before its adoption. While, conceivably, a different system might be devised by which the tax
could be assessed, wholly or in part, on the basis of the finally ascertained results of particular transactions,
Congress is not required by the amendment to adopt such a system in preference to the more
familiar method, even if it were practicable.”) (citations omitted, emphasis added).
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See e.g. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 233 (1992) (“As this Court has recognized, Congress
intended through § 61(a) and its statutory precursors to exert ‘the full measure of its taxing power,’ and to
bring within the definition of income any ‘accession to wealth.’”) (citations omitted); Commissioner v.
Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429 (1955) (“This Court has frequently stated that this language was
used by Congress to exert in this field ‘the full measure of its taxing power.’”) (citations omitted);
Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940) (“The broad sweep of this language indicates the purpose
of Congress to use the full measure of its taxing power within those definable categories.”).
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Congress,392 and by the historical exclusions that have been recognized by the Treasury
Department in the administration of the tax laws either for reasons of administrative
convenience or fundamental fairness.
Similarly, by 1940, the Court had pulled away from the notion that realization
was mandated by the 16th Amendment. The pullback began in Helvering v. Braun.393
Prior to Braun, the courts had relied on Macomber in holding that a tenant’s
improvements to the landlord’s property were not income to the landlord at the time the
improvements were made, nor were ratable portions of the value of the tenant’s
improvements additional rent that could be taxed over the term of the lease.394 The
landlord in Braun argued that the improvements could not be taxed until the property was
sold, and any gain “severed” from the real estate. The Court rejected the landlord’s
argument, allowing the value of the improvements to be taxed to the landlord at the time
the lease terminated. Braun was decided on the basis of the broad language used in the
taxing statute, which the Court said “follows closely the Sixteenth Amendment.”395 Later
that year, in Helvering v. Horst,396 the Court held that a donor would be taxed on the
interest paid on a bond even though the interest coupon had been given to the donor’s son
before it matured and was paid. The Court held that the gift of the income coupon was a
realization event. In defining realization, the Court backed far away from the
constitutional mandate it had found in Macomber:
From the beginning the revenue laws have been interpreted as
defining "realization" of income as the taxable event, rather than
the acquisition of the right to receive it. . . . The rule [that income
is not taxable until realized], founded on administrative
convenience, is only one of postponement of the tax to the final
event of enjoyment of the income, usually the receipt of it by the
taxpayer, and not one of exemption from taxation where the
enjoyment is consummated by some event other than the taxpayer's
personal receipt of money or property.397
More recently, the Court in Cottage Savings Association v. Commissioner,398 reaffirmed
the notion that realization is merely a matter of administrative convenience,399 and that
Macomber remains of interest only because Congress enacted its statutory rules in that
“contemporary legal context.”400
392
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Finally, the Court has rejected Macomber’s narrow definition of income, which
was taken from the 1907 Corporate Tax – “a gain derived from capital, labor or both
combined.”401 In deciding that windfall recoveries like punitive damages were taxable as
income, the Court in Commissioner v. Glanshaw Glass402 defined income broadly to
include all “undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the
taxpayers have complete dominion,”403 and held that the definition used in Macomber
“was not meant to provide a touchstone to all future gross income questions.”404
Although virtually every aspect of the Macomber holding has been undermined,
the Court has never over-ruled the case, and in fact specifically declined an invitation to
do so. The opportunity to reconsider Macomber arose when Congress amended the
statute to provide for the taxation of all stock dividends unless they do “not constitute
income to the shareholder within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment to the
Constitution."405 The statute was first amended in 1936, but the issue did not come
before the Supreme Court until the 1943 case of Helvering v. Griffiths.406 In Griffiths, the
government asked the Court to finally over-rule Macomber by holding that the small
stock dividend in issue would be taxable under the 1939 Code. While recognizing that
the “original theoretical bases of the decision in Eisner v. Macomber” had been
undermined by later decisions of the Court, the Court nevertheless declined to over-rule
Macomber, finding instead that Congress, in enacting the new statutory language, had
intended to incorporate rather than challenge the rule of Macomber.407 In his dissent in
Griffiths, Justice Douglas said that “Eisner v. Macomber dies a slow death.”408
Indeed it does, for the court of appeals’ decision in Murphy transports us back
nearly 90 years to a time when courts thought they were empowered to overturn the
taxing acts of Congress by attributing to the language of the 16th Amendment a meaning
that they desire – a meaning nowhere expressed in the statute or its history. The only
clear purpose of the 16th Amendment was to overturn the Pollock Court’s interpretation
of the direct taxing clause as a restriction on Congress’s power to impose broad based
taxes on income from property without apportionment. Congress may well have thought
it necessary or advisable in 1918 to exclude personal injury awards after the Supreme
Court had narrowly interpreted income as a “gain from capital, from labor or from both
combined,” but it is difficult to see how that ruling should have currency today, under the
much broader definition of income adopted by the Supreme Court in Glenshaw Glass.409
By attributing constitutional currency to statutory decisions from the Macomber
era, the court of appeals in Murphy unwittingly returned to a long-ago rejected definition
of “income.” Under the standard enunciated by the Court in Glenshaw Glass, the proper
has left undisturbed through subsequent reenactments of the Code the principles of realization established
in these cases, we may presume that Congress intended to codify these principles in § 1001(a).”).
401
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question in Murphy was whether Ms. Murphy realized an “accession to wealth” when she
exchanged her emotional distress damages for cash, not whether Ms. Murphy realized a
gain from her capital or labor. To determine whether Ms. Murphy realized an “accession
to wealth,” it is necessary to determine what the Supreme Court means by wealth. If, as
the court of appeals in Murphy seemed to suggest, wealth means the fair market value of
one’s property at the time of sale, than virtually no arms’ length sale would result in an
accession of wealth. On the other hand, if wealth consists solely of previously taxed or
previously exempted income that has been invested in real or personal property, under the
concept called “basis,” then Ms. Murphy’s entire award would constitute an “accession to
wealth” and be income.
(4)

Ms. Murphy Realized Income Because She Had No Basis in Her
Human Capital.

The court of appeals in Murphy held that Ms. Murphy’s award of emotional and
reputational damages was not “income” because it was intended to compensate Ms.
Murphy for her lost emotional well being, and that emotional well being would not have
been subject to tax if it had not been lost.410
There are two conceptual problems with the court of appeals’ holding. First, it is
not necessarily true that Ms. Murphy would not have received additional taxable income
if her emotional well being had not been lost. In order to recover lost wages, a claimant
must generally prove precise and specific losses.411 While Ms. Murphy did not receive a
separate award for lost wages (presumably because she could not prove specific wage
losses), it is entirely possible that she would have made more income from her labor if
she had been feeling well than she made in her impaired state. An inability to prove the
precise amount of losses does not mean losses did not occur. Whether Ms. Murphy’s
emotional well being would have been consumed in leisure or used to generate additional
income is entirely speculative. Indeed, the proponents of the amendment to IRC section
104(a)(2) stated in the House committee report the belief that emotional distress claims
generally result in receipts that would have generated taxable income if the emotional
distress had not occurred.412 Certainly it would be difficult for the administrators of the
tax law and the courts to determine precisely how much of a general compensatory award
compensated for losses that would have resulted in additional taxable income if the losses
had not occurred and how much of the award compensated for the loss of one’s own
410
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consumption of human capital (which would not have been subject to taxation). The
court of appeals’ counter-factual conclusion that the lost emotional well being would not
have resulted in additional taxable income was both speculative and contrary to
Congress’s purpose in restricting the exclusion in IRC section 104(a)(2).
Secondly, in determining that Ms. Murphy realized no gain or accession to wealth
as a result of the emotional and reputational damages award, the court of appeals
incorrectly focused on the market value of the property rights (Ms. Murphy’s lost human
capital as a result of her injury) that were exchanged for cash in the award, rather than
Ms. Murphy’s tax cost basis in the property exchanged (her lost human capital).
From the time of the first modern income tax acts, Congress and the courts
recognized that not all gross proceeds from the sale of property constitute income under
the taxing acts.413 Some sales proceeds represented merely the recovery of the taxpayer’s
original investment. As a general matter, the funds used to make that original investment
in the property had come either from income that had been previously taxed, from
income that had been permanently exempted from tax when earned (either because the
funds had been earned before the income tax law went into effect, or because the funds
were for some other reason not subject to tax), or from borrowed funds that would have
to be repaid from previously taxed income.414 For example, when a taxpayer buys
property for $100, and later sells the property for $300. We all know that the taxpayer
has $200 of gain that is realized as income at the time of sale. The income tax statute
does not reach the entire $300 in sale proceeds because $100 of the proceeds represents
merely the recovery of taxpayer’s original cost in purchasing the property. To tax the
original taxpayer again at the time of sale on the recovery of the taxpayer’s original
investment of $100 would either be to impose a double tax on the same original income
earned by the same taxpayer, or to tax previously exempted income that had been
invested in property.
The IRC keeps track of the taxpayer’s investment in property of previously taxed
or exempt income through a mechanism called “basis.” The taxpayer receives basis for
the original purchase cost of the property,415 and gets an increase in basis for any

413

Prior to the adoption of the 16th Amendment, the Supreme Court had defined income from property as
the increase in value during ownership. See Gray v. Darlington, 82 U.S. 63 (1872) (gain in value of
bonds); Stratton’s Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399 (1913) (gains from operation of mine).
While the early Courts did not discuss the notion of cost basis, the principle that the recovery of the
taxpayer’s previously taxed capital would not be income was well recognized. The 1913 Act imposed a tax
on “net income” which included “the gains, profits and income derived from . . . sales or dealings in
property, whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership or use of or interest in real or personal
property.” Tariff Act of October 3, 1913, § II, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 166, 167. The 1916 Act used the same
language, but added an exclusion for the value of the property on March 1, 1913, if acquired before that
date. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756. While these early tax statutes did not more specifically
define the word “gain,” it was recognized that the mere recoupment of an original investment did not
represent gain.
414
Even if the $100 came from borrowed funds rather than income, those funds will either have to be
repaid with previously taxed or excluded income, or, if the debt is canceled, cancellation of indebtedness
income will have to be recognized. See United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931); IRC
§108(a). The tax system gives the taxpayer a basis in borrowed funds because of the taxpayer’s obligation
to repay the loan.
415
IRC § 1012.

67

additional non-deductible capital improvement investments made in the property.416
Likewise, the taxpayer must reduce basis for the benefits received from the property,
either in the form of tax deductions for depreciation and the like or other non-taxable
recoveries received from the property.417 The cost basis, as adjusted up for additional
investments and down for the recovery of benefits, is known as the “adjusted basis.”418
When the property is sold, the tax cost “adjusted basis,” representing the taxpayers
investment of already-taxed or exempt income in the property, is subtracted from the
sales price (known as the “amount realized”) in arriving at the gain that is subject to
tax.419 The fundamental purpose of these basis rules is to prevent a taxpayer from being
taxed twice on the same income, or from being taxed on income earned earlier that had
been exempted. The untaxed increase in the value of property prior to realization may
constitute economic capital or wealth, but, because that increase in value was not
previously subject to tax and was not permanently exempted, it does not result in basis
that can be used to offset gain. This concept of basis is necessary for a realization system
of income taxation to properly reach, at the time of realization, the increase in the value
of property that accrued in prior periods.
The distinction between a recovery of economic capital and a recovery of tax-cost
basis was recognized in by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Raytheon
Production Corp. v. Commissioner.420 The issue in Raytheon was whether a corporation
was required to include in income an anti-trust damages recovery. The court of appeals
first recognized that anti-trust damages recovered on account of lost profits would be
taxable because the lost profits would have been taxable. The development of the “in lieu
of what” test for allocating recoveries is often credited to the opinion in Raytheon.
Equally important were the Raytheon court’s comments about the distinction
between basis and economic capital. After holding that Raytheon’s anti-trust recoveries
were on account of good will (generally not taxed until the business is sold) and not lost
profits (generally taxed each year), the court considered whether the recoveries of capital
might nevertheless be subject to taxation as income. The court of appeals rejected
Raytheon’s argument that capital recoveries were inherently non-taxable:
[T]o say that the recovery represents a return of capital in that it
takes the place of the business good will is not to conclude that it
may not contain a taxable benefit. Although the injured party may
not be deriving a profit as a result of the damage suit itself, the
conversion thereby of his property into cash is a realization of any
gain made over the cost or other basis of the good will prior to the
illegal interference. Thus A buys Blackacre for $5,000. It
appreciates in value to $50,000. B tortiously destroys it by fire. A
sues and recovers $50,000 tort damages from B. Although no gain
was derived by A from the suit, his prior gain due to the
416
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appreciation in value of Blackacre is realized when it is turned into
cash by the money damages. Compensation for the loss of
Raytheon's good will in excess of its cost is gross income.421
This distinction between a taxable recovery of capital and a non-taxable recovery of basis
is fundamental to the realization system of income taxation utilized since the adoption of
the 16th Amendment.422
After first focusing on ancient understandings of the word “income” from the
early 20th Century, the court of appeals in Murphy correctly framed the issue before it in
the modern terms employed in Glenshaw Glass – whether Ms. Murphy’s compensatory
damage award resulted in an accession to wealth423 – but then failed to analyze the
question in a coherent way. The court of appeals simply concluded that Ms. Murphy’s
award was “but a restoration of the status quo ante, analogous to a restoration of capital,
in neither context does the payment result in a ‘gain’ or ‘accession to wealth.’”424
The court of appeals in Murphy ruled that emotional distress damages awards are
not taxable because they compensate for something that would not have been taxed if it
had not been lost – emotional and reputational well-being that would not have resulted in
additional wages. The court of appeals suggested that Ms. Murphy received no gain – no
“accession to wealth” – because the value of her lost emotional and reputational wellbeing equaled the amount of the settlement.425 But gain is not measured by the value at
the time of exchange of the property interests transferred. As we have seen, gain426 in
property transactions is measured by deducting from the amount realized in the exchange
only the seller’s tax-cost basis in the property.427 In computing gain, the seller cannot
reduce the amount realized by the market value of the property sold. Under the court of
appeals’ analysis in Murphy, an arm’s length sale of property would generally result in no
taxable income, because the amount received from the sale would simply equal the value
of the property transferred – and thus there would be no gain. The court of appeals’
approach ignores the appreciation in value that is inherent in the property sold. That
appreciation is realized as taxable gain at the time of sale.
The court of appeals rejected the government’s argument that Ms. Murphy did not
have any basis in her human capital, and therefore the entire amount received from the
settlement was gain or income.428 The court of appeals simply said “we reject the
421
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Government’s breathtakingly expansive claim of congressional power under the
Sixteenth Amendment – upon which it founds the more far–reaching arguments advanced
here.”429
Yet, the point made by the government is fundamental. The court of appeals in
Murphy erred by focusing on whether Ms. Murphy recovered capital, rather than focusing
on whether Ms. Murphy recovered more than her tax-cost basis. Any recovery in excess
of basis causes an increase in realized wealth, and the Supreme Court has made it clear
that increases in realized wealth are income.430 If human capital recoveries were taxed as
property, then the court of appeals in Murphy should have taxed the amount of the award
that exceeded Ms. Murphy’s proven basis in her human capital.
By focusing solely on whether the recovery constitutes a return of capital, without
regard to tax-cost basis, the court of appeals in Murphy charts a return to the days before
Smietakna431 when some thought that capital gains could not be taxed as income because
there had been no gain – measured by the value of the market value of the property
transferred at the time of the exchange. The court of appeals in Murphy failed to consider
whether Ms. Murphy’s tax-basis wealth was increased when she received a cash payment
on account of a human capital interest that had not been previously taxed or permanently
exempted from tax when it accrued.432
Other courts have recognized that a taxpayer must recognize income upon the sale
of human capital. For example, in Roemer v. Commissioner,433 the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit allowed the taxpayer to exclude damages recovered for defamation
under an earlier version of IRC section 104(a)(2). In a footnote, however, the court
noted:
Since there is no tax basis in a person's health and other personal
interest, money received as compensation for an injury to those
interests might be considered a realized accession to wealth.
Nevertheless, Congress in its compassion has retained the
exclusion.434
In Polone v. Commissioner,435 the taxpayer settled a defamation claim prior to the
effective date of the 1996 amendments adding the “physical injury or physical sickness”
to section 104(a)(2). However, the settlement provided for structured payments to be
made in the future, which were held to be subject to the new statute when received. The
Ninth Circuit held that the payments were taxable as income because the taxpayer had no
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basis in his human capital.436 Cases involving the sale of one’s blood recognize that the
proceeds received are income because a taxpayer has no basis in their own body parts.437
The court of appeals’ holding that Ms. Murphy’s emotional and reputational
damages award was not income was thus wrong for two reasons. First, the court of
appeals erred in concluding that the award was not received in lieu of income that would
have been taxed, because Ms. Murphy’s emotional and reputational losses may well have
reduced her taxable income from what it would have been if the losses had not occurred.
Second, even if it were proper to treat human capital as property, an issue discussed
below,438 the court of appeals failed to recognize that Ms. Murphy’s award resulted in an
accession to her tax-basis wealth, because she had not previously been taxed on the
increase in the value of her lost human capital.
This basis analysis assumes that human capital would be treated like financial
capital by the income tax system. As discussed below, the implicit theory underlying the
court of appeals’ holding in Murphy would work a substantial change in the taxation of
income from human capital, and would threaten the longstanding treatment of wages as
taxable income.
(5)

Ms. Murphy’s Receipts from Human Capital Were Income.

The court of appeals in Murphy erred by assuming that human capital is wealth,
and thus that Ms. Murphy realized no accession to wealth, and thus no income, when she
received the award of emotional and reputational damages.
The modern concept of human capital was largely developed by economists
beginning in the 1950s.439 According to economist Gary Becker’s Nobel Prize speech,
which was cited by the court of appeals in Murphy as support for Ms. Murphy’s argument
that her damages award was a recovery of capital rather than income,440 the modern
concept of human capital is based on the theory that “individuals decide on their
education, training, medical care, and other additions to knowledge and health by
weighing the benefits and costs. Benefits include cultural and other non-monetary gains
along with improvement in earnings and occupations, while costs usually depend mainly
436
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on the foregone value of the time spent on these investments.”441 The court of appeals
did not explain why these modern economic theories of human behavior should dictate
tax policy, or more importantly how these recent theories support the court of appeals’
view that the enactors of the 16th Amendment in 1913 thought that human capital
recoveries were not income.
Modern economic theories aside, the history of wage taxation shows that human
capital has never been treated as property. Wages under every income tax act have been
taxable as income without reduction for one’s basis in the human capital being sold. It
could have been otherwise. The tax system could have been structured to require
taxpayers to keep track of their investments in human capital – everything from education
and non-deductible medical expenditures, to food, shelter and clothing – and to reduce
the gains realized from the sale of human capital in the form of wages or damages
settlements by the amount of those investments. However, the tax system has never
treated human capital as property. Unless specifically allowed by statute, investments in
one’s own human capital do not give rise to basis that can be used to offset amounts
realized from the sale of human capital for wages or other fees.442
In fact, all proceeds from the sale of human capital have been taxed as income,
unless Congress has saw fit to provide an exemption or a deduction. Congress has
always taxed the gross proceeds from the sale of labor, and arguments that wages should
be treated as a non-taxable recovery of capital have been repeatedly rejected as frivolous
by the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals in every circuit.443 Therefore, the notion
that payments on account of human capital are not income because they are in lieu of
human capital, which would not be taxed if consumed through leisure rather than sold, is
simply incorrect.
441
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One apparent distinction between ordinary wages and Ms. Murphy’s
compensatory damages award is that wages involve the voluntary sale of human capital,
while Ms. Murphy’s injury was involuntary. However, property sold involuntarily, and
recoveries for damage to property on account of casualty, have long been treated as
taxable in the same general manner as voluntary property sales.444 The tax system treats
both voluntary and involuntary sales of property for cash the same way. If there is no tax
difference between the voluntary and involuntary sale of property for cash, why would
there be a constitutional difference between the voluntary and involuntary sale of human
capital for cash? After all, according to the court of appeals’ theory, human capital is
property. The involuntary nature of the income may, as some academics have argued,445
constitute policy grounds for Congress to grant an exclusion, as Congress did for many
years, but the involuntary nature does not constitute constitutional grounds for treating
the recovery as non-taxable tax-cost basis rather than as income. Furthermore, the 16th
Amendment on its face makes no distinction between voluntarily and involuntarily
received income. The court of appeals’ theory that Congress cannot tax recoveries of
human capital under the 16th Amendment was not based on the involuntary nature of the
recovery.
The proper question in the Murphy case, under the standard laid down by the
Supreme Court in Glenshaw Glass,446 was whether Ms. Murphy’s damages award
constituted a realized “accession to wealth.” If the award constituted an accession to Ms.
Murphy’s wealth, then it would constitute “income” under the 16th Amendment. The
historic treatment of wage income shows that human capital was not considered wealth
when the 16th Amendment was adopted. Without doubt, Ms. Murphy increased her
financial wealth when she traded her emotional distress and reputational injuries for cash,
just as a laborer receives an increase in financial wealth when she trades her non-taxable
leisure time for wages. And just like a laborer who sells human capital in the form of
labor for cash, Ms. Murphy realized income that was subject to tax under the 16th
Amendment when she sold her human capital in the form of emotional distress damages
for cash.
The court of appeals in Murphy tried to distinguish between a monetary recovery
on account of human capital in the form of wages, which would be taxable, and a
monetary recovery on account of human capital in the form of damages, which would not
be taxable, by arguing that non-wage human capital is normally not taxed.447 It is
certainly true that one’s consumption of one’s own human capital is not taxed, just as
one’s consumption of one’s own property is not taxed.448 However, Ms. Murphy did not
444
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consume her own human capital – she sold it for cash. She received cash that she could
use to satisfy other (and often more material) desires. Had Ms. Murphy’s recovery been
in reimbursement of non-deductible medical care expenses to restore her emotional well
being, Congress would have allowed her an exclusion.449 It was the conversion of her
emotional distress to cash that gave rise to realized gain, income and taxation. In sum,
the court of appeals utterly failed to demonstrate that Ms. Murphy’s recovery of money
on account of her emotional or reputational injury was not “income” within the original
meaning of the 16th Amendment.
V.

Conclusion.

The court of appeals in Murphy made many errors in concluding that IRC Section
104(a)(2) was unconstitutional in allowing the government to tax Ms. Murphy’s
emotional distress and reputational injury award. This paper attempts to analyze the
question correctly by first considering the statutory questions: whether Ms. Murphy’s
award could properly be excluded from income, and if not by considering whether the
statute required the award to be included in income.
The court of appeals properly considered whether Ms. Murphy’s award was
statutorily excluded from income under IRC section 104(a)(2).450 However, the court of
appeals erred in focusing on the language used in the heading of the award rather than the
intent of the Department of Labor hearing board in setting the amount of the award.451
The award, in fact, compensated Ms. Murphy for the physical manifestations of her
emotional distress.452 If Ms. Murphy’s physical manifestations of emotional distress
constituted a “personal physical injury or physical sickness” under the statute, then Ms.
Murphy’s award would have been excluded from income under IRC section 104(a)(2),
notwithstanding the language used by the hearing board in the heading of the award. The
court of appeals in Murphy failed to ask the right question.
Yet, the Court reached the correct result – that Ms. Murphy’s award was not
statutory excluded from income – because the legislative history of IRC section 104(a)(2)
shows that Congress did not intend physical manifestations of emotional distress to

products . . . would automatically subject such amounts to normal tax and in effect include in income
something which Congress did not intend should be so regarded. If products of a farm consumed thereon
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35, obsoleted by Rev. Rul. 72-619, 1972-2 C.B. 650, 1972 IRB LEXIS 293, Rev. Rul. 72-619 (1972)
(“The value of the use and occupancy of a dwelling by the owner thereof does not constitute gross income
to him. However, when transformed into cash, as where an owner rents his property to another, the amounts
received constitute gross income.”) (citation omitted).
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constitute a “physical injury or physical sickness” within the meaning of the statute.453
This legislative history was relied on by all of the other courts that have considered
similar questions,454 although curiously none of these cases was cited by the court of
appeals in Murphy.
Having properly concluded, for the wrong reason, that Ms. Murphy’s award was
not excluded from income by IRC section 104(a)(2), the court of appeals should next
have considered whether Congress required the award to be included in income by any
provision of the IRC. Contrary to the court of appeals’ suggestion, the lack of an
exclusion does not mandate inclusion.455 Congress must affirmatively seek to tax the
award. IRC section 61 requires all “income” to be included in “gross income” and thus
be subject to taxation.456 Because the court of appeals was required to first determine that
the statute required taxation before considering the constitutionality of the statute,457 the
court of appeals must implicitly have determined that Ms. Murphy’s award constituted
“income” within the meaning of IRC section 61.
The court of appeals’ implicit determination was correct, because Congress
clearly intended when IRC section 104(a)(2) was amended in 1996 for “income” under
section 61 to include those personal injury awards that were no longer excluded from
income. Congress made its intent clear in the legislative history,458 but its intent was also
manifest from the statutory amendment itself. There would be no rational reason for
Congress to go to the trouble of specifically eliminating the exclusion if it did not intend
to render non-excluded awards taxable.459 Under the doctrine of statutory evolution,
Congress’s intent when it amended IRC section 104(a)(2) is effective for prospectively
interpreting the ambiguous meaning of the word “income” in section 61.460 Therefore,
Congress did seek to tax Ms. Murphy’s award in IRC section 61, and it was thus proper
for the court of appeals to consider whether Congress’s statutory enactment was
constitutional.
In considering the constitutionality of the statute, the court of appeals concluded
that the 16th Amendment did not authorize Congress to tax Ms. Murphy’s award because
it was not “income.” The court of appeals then held IRC section 104(a)(2) to be
unconstititional.
The Court’s holding that section 104(a)(2) was unconstitutional was wrong in a
number of ways. First, section 104(a)(2) is an exclusion provision. The elimination of an
exclusion cannot be unconstitutional because Congress is not required to exclude all
things that are not “income.” If anything is unconstitutional, it would be IRC section 61,
which required Ms. Murphy to include her award in income.461
Second, the Court was flat wrong to hold that the 16th Amendment is the sole
source of Congress’s taxing power. Congress’s taxing power emanates from Article I of
the Constitution, and includes the power to tax everything except exports. However, the
453
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Constitution requires Congress to apportion direct taxes. Since the tax on Ms. Murphy’s
damage award was not apportioned, it would not be valid if it constituted a direct tax and
was not “income” within the 16th Amendment. Therefore, the court of appeals should
have considered whether or not the tax was direct.
The history of the direct taxing clause shows that only capitation taxes, poll taxes
and taxes on real and personal property, and the income therefrom, were ever considered
direct, and that human capital in the form of wages was never considered “property” for
purposes of the direct taxing clause.462 Moreover, the courts have repeatedly treated the
taxation of transactions as an indirect “duty or excise,” requiring no apportionment.463
Ms. Murphy engaged in a transaction when she exchanged her emotional and reputational
injuries for money. Thus, even if Congress correctly concluded that the award was not
income, Congress had the power to tax the award under the Supreme Court’s
longstanding interpretations of Congressional power under Article I of the Constitution.
Third, court of appeals erred in concluding that the award was not “income”
within the meaning of the 16th Amendment. The court of appeals cited no credible
evidence that the enactors of the 16th Amendment intended compensatory damage
awards not to be treated as income.464 Under the Supreme Court’s modern interpretation
of income, any realized accession to wealth – which includes any recovery of money
from property in excess of basis – is taxable as income.465 Individuals generally are not
given basis for their investments in their own human capital.466 Therefore, any recovery
on account of human capital is subject to tax, absent a specific statutory exclusion. This
is most evident with wages. The Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeals in every
circuit have rejected as frivolous the argument that wages are not income because they
represent the recovery of capital.
The court of appeals in Murphy has accepted, for the first time, the vary argument
advanced by the most provocative tax protestors,467 although in a slightly different guise.
The argument is that wages, which are recoveries on account of human capital, are not
income because there is no gain or accession to wealth, since the market value of the
human capital sold equaled the value of the wages received. The courts have repeatedly
recognized, however, that because one does not have basis in one’s own human capital,
the recovery of any money on account of human capital is income, since it results in an
accession to one’s financial wealth.
Using proper analysis, the Court should have determined that Ms. Murphy’s
award constituted income under both section 61 and the 16th Amendment, and therefore
Congress’s tax on the award was valid. Moreover, the court of appeals should have
determined that even if the award was not income under the 16th Amendment, the tax on
Ms. Murphy’s damages award under IRC section 61 was still constitutional because
Congress had the power under Article I of the Constitution to tax the award without
apportionment as a duty or excise.
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While valid policy arguments can be made for the exclusion of emotional distress
and reputational injury awards,468 those policy arguments should be addressed to
Congress, not the courts. The Constitution delegates to our elected officials in Congress
the power to decide questions of tax policy within the broad limits established by the
Constitution. Congress decided to eliminate the exclusion for emotional distress and
reputational damages awards because, as explained in the legislative history, Congress
sought to minimize unnecessary litigation over the difficult factual question of
determining whether an emotional recovery was in lieu of taxable income or not – an
inquiry that Congress felt had bogged down the judicial process.469 Even if one were to
disagree with Congress’s policy decisions, Congress’s decisions were certainly rational.
The remedy for those who disagree with Congress’s policy decisions is the ballot box,
not the courts. The erroneous decision in Murphy should be promptly overturned.
As of November 3, 2006
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